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Court of AppealDismissedNot stated in the judgment· [1987] KECA 27 (KLR)

Nduati v Gitiha Farm [1987] KECA 27 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
11 June 1987
3,760 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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·~15 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled you cannot accept a court consent order when it helps you, then later reject it, especially where agricultural land lacks Land Control Board consent.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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Julius Nduati, a one-share partner in Gitiha Farm, obtained a magistrate's order declaring him a shareholder, then a December 1983 Land Control Board consent to five plots. The Farm Committee sought certiorari against that consent, but instead of ruling on the leave application under Order LIII rule 1, the High Court judge recorded a consent order on June 20, 1984 declaring Nduati a shareholder with one share and one plot. Nduati relied on that order to seek an injunction, which produced a further consent order of November 23, 1984 allocating him plots 34 and 49. In September 1985 he applied to review the June 1984 order; the judge dismissed the application on October 14, 1985, and Nduati appealed. The Court of Appeal (Platt, Nyarangi and Gachuhi JJ A) dismissed the appeal. Platt JA held the judge had jurisdiction to record the consent order despite the missing leave, that the appellant could not approbate and reprobate by denying consent he had earlier relied on, that certiorari lies against a Land Control Board acting in excess of jurisdiction notwithstanding section 8 of the Land Control Act, and that any consent order constituting a transaction in agricultural land under section 6 becomes void absent timely Board consent. Nyarangi JA concurred but guarded against any suggestion the High Court had jurisdiction to make the June 1984 order, stressing the mandatory nature of the leave requirement. Gachuhi JA concurred, urging the parties to seek fresh consent for a revised subdivision plan. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Key legal issues

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01

Effect of non-compliance with the leave requirement of Order LIII rule 1 on the certiorari proceedings and the consent order

Holding

The court had jurisdiction to record the consent order notwithstanding that leave was never granted, because the judge had not dealt with the application; parties may always compromise an application pending before the court, provided the consent does not purport to confer jurisdiction the court does not possess. Nyarangi JA, however, guarded against any suggestion that the High Court had jurisdiction to make the June 20, 1984 order.

Reasoning

The judge had not adjudicated the certiorari application but had sidetracked it into a consent order. Up to the moment of the consent order he could have granted leave. Parties have an inherent right to compromise a pending application unless the compromise purports to clothe the court with jurisdiction it lacks. The consent order did not deal with the application at all, so the proceedings were not a nullity. The judge's reasoning that the irregularity was waived was wrong, but the order stood on other grounds.

p. 3
02

Whether the appellant could deny having consented to the June 20, 1984 order

Holding

He could not: having relied on the consent order in his own injunction application of October 1984 seeking to enforce it, he was estopped from denying his consent one year later; he could not approbate and reprobate.

Reasoning

The appellant had invoked the June 20, 1984 order in a supporting affidavit seeking an injunction to compel the committee to comply with it. Having thus clearly supported the order during the injunction proceedings, it was unjust for him to seek its review, and the judge was right to dismiss the review on that ground.

p. 3
03

Whether section 8 of the Land Control Act bars certiorari against a Land Control Board consent

Holding

Certiorari does not infringe section 8, because section 8 presupposes the consent was regularly obtained; where the Board acts in excess of jurisdiction or wrongly in law, including upon fraud, certiorari is available.

Reasoning

The statutory appeal system under the Act operates only where consent has been refused. Finality under section 8 attaches only if the Board complies with proper procedure; fraud or statutory impropriety would mean the consent was not regularly obtained and can be quashed. In this case there were arguably grounds meriting the judge's attention on the leave application.

p. 4
04

Validity of the June 20, 1984 consent order under section 6 of the Land Control Act

Holding

The consent order effected a further dealing in agricultural land; since no Land Control Board consent was obtained for it, it stands to be void for lapse of time, and is unenforceable unless consent is obtained.

Reasoning

The order departed from the terms of the December 2, 1983 Board consent. A transaction in agricultural land caught by section 6, whether inside or outside court, becomes void unless consent is acquired within time. The parties, who had obtained consent in 1977 and 1983, knew the rules; the prudent course was to present an updated plan to the Board for fresh consent.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • An application for an order of certiorari may only be made after leave has been granted under Order LIII rule 1; the leave requirement is mandatory
  • A court's jurisdiction cannot be conferred by a compromise or consent between litigants
  • Certiorari lies to quash decisions of statutory bodies such as Land Control Boards taken in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to law, notwithstanding the finality provision of section 8 of the Land Control Act
  • Consent orders recorded by a court involving transactions in agricultural land caught by section 6 of the Land Control Act become void for want of timely Land Control Board consent, like any agreement outside court
  • A litigant who has relied on and benefited from a consent order cannot later deny consenting to it; he cannot approbate and reprobate
  • There is no time limit for applying for review where the application depends on ascertaining an error on the face of the record or newly discovered evidence

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed
  2. 2.Appellant to pay the costs of the appeal to the respondents
On appeal from
High Court at Eldoret
Not stated (certiorari application; consent order of June 20, 1984; ruling of October 14, 1985)
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over an appeal from the High Court (first appeal against the dismissal of an application for review); no specific constitutional provision invoked

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Nduati v Gitiha Farm [1987] KECA 27 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1987). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1987/27/eng@1987-06-11

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.