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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal (from refusal of temporary injunction by Schofield J)

Mbuthia v Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & another [1988] KECA 116 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
12 July 1988
11,876 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~48 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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A Kenyan homeowner whose house was auctioned below value won an injunction stopping its transfer while his fraud claim is heard in full.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant, a mortgagor acting in person, appealed against the refusal by Schofield J of the High Court to grant a temporary injunction restraining Jimba Credit Corporation Ltd from transferring his charged house, Nairobi/Block 73/225, to the second respondent, a purchaser at a public auction held on 13th February 1986 for Kshs 200,000/-. The mortgagor alleged the sale was at a gross undervalue against a valuation of Kshs 375,000/- and sought nullification of the sale. The Court of Appeal, by a majority of Platt JA and Masime Ag JA, with Apaloo JA dissenting, allowed the appeal. The majority held that the learned Judge misdirected himself by making final findings of fact on disputed affidavits - namely that there was no undervalue, fraud or irregularity - at an interlocutory stage; the correct approach was to weigh the relative strength of each side's case and, in case of doubt, seek the balance of convenience, which favoured the mortgagor whose home was the subject of the suit. On the law, the majority accepted that under the Registered Land Act the equity of redemption is extinguished when a binding contract of sale is concluded (on the fall of the hammer), not on registration, but that the mortgagor retains a bare title under section 77(4) until registration which aids a prompt mortgagor. Apaloo JA dissented: he held no fresh notice was required after suspension of a sale, the equity of redemption was extinguished on acceptance of the bid, the purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value against whom irregularities sound only in damages, and there was no evidence of bad faith; he would have dismissed the appeal. The Court granted the injunction as prayed on the conditions previously imposed, with costs of the appeal to the appellant.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in refusing a temporary injunction pending trial
  2. 2.Whether the Court of Appeal should interfere with the exercise of that discretion
  3. 3.What duty the law casts on a mortgagee/chargee exercising the statutory power of sale as regards the price obtained
  4. 4.When the mortgagor's equity of redemption is extinguished under the Registered Land Act
  5. 5.Whether fresh statutory notice was required after suspension of a sale
  6. 6.Whether the purchaser's late payment of the balance of the purchase price invalidated the sale

Key legal issues

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01

Duty of a mortgagee selling under the statutory power of sale

Holding

The mortgagee must act in good faith and take reasonable care to obtain the true market value of the property at the time chosen for sale; a sale may be set aside for fraud or where the price is so low as to be in itself evidence of fraud, but not on undervalue alone.

Reasoning

Relying on section 77 of the Registered Land Act, Halsbury's Laws, and the Cuckmere Brick line of English authority as explained in Standard Chartered Bank v Walker (and said to have been approved in Kenya Commercial Bank v Osebe), the Court held the mortgagee is not a trustee of the power of sale but must take reasonable care to obtain the true market value. Whether the price of Kshs 200,000 against valuations of up to Kshs 375,000 was itself evidence of fraud was a matter of evidence for trial.

p. 2
02

When the equity of redemption is extinguished under the Registered Land Act

Holding

The equity of redemption is extinguished when the contract of sale is validly concluded, i.e. on acceptance of a bid at auction, not on conveyance or registration; however the bare title retained by the mortgagor under section 77(4) still aids a prompt mortgagor.

Reasoning

The majority reasoned that upon first registration under the Registered Land Act, the Indian Transfer of Property Act ceased to apply and English common law and equity were introduced by sections 163 and 164. English authority (Waring, Bloodstock) holds the equity is lost on a valid contract of sale. The 1985 amendment to section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act equated Kenyan law with the English position. Section 77(4) preserves a bare title in the mortgagor until registration, which assists a mortgagor who acts promptly.

p. 4
03

Interference with the High Court's discretionary refusal of an interlocutory injunction

Holding

The Judge went beyond his proper duties by making final findings of fact on disputed affidavits at the interlocutory stage; the Court of Appeal was therefore entitled to reconsider the exercise of discretion, and would grant the injunction since disputed facts raised doubt and the balance of convenience favoured the mortgagor whose home was the subject of the suit.

Reasoning

The learned Judge had concluded the plaintiff had not even a possibility of success and had emphatically found no undervaluation, no irregularity and no fraud on the affidavits. The majority held that at the interlocutory stage the court should weigh the relative strength of the parties' propositions, not decide issues of fact; the conflicting valuations necessitated a hearing of the evidence. In land disputes it is usual to grant an injunction, and it was right to do so on terms.

p. 4
04

Whether fresh statutory notice was required after suspension of a sale (dissent, with majority doubting its relevance at interlocutory stage)

Holding

Apaloo JA held that the chargee is not obliged to give fresh notice where a sale is suspended as an indulgence to the mortgagor; the right of sale and the running of notice revive.

Reasoning

Section 74 of the Registered Land Act imposes no obligation to give more than one notice, and no policy reason supports a contrary rule. Fisher & Lightwood and Wood v Murton establish that where the sale is stopped on an indulgence later dishonoured, the right of sale and running of notice revive without a new notice. Platt JA treated the notice point as a matter for trial since it was not raised in the plaint.

p. 9
05

Effect of the purchaser's late payment of the balance of the purchase price

Holding

Late payment of the balance does not invalidate the sale where the vendor does not insist on strict compliance; the equity of redemption is extinguished when a binding contract of sale is entered into notwithstanding late completion.

Reasoning

Per Apaloo JA, the mortgagee was prepared to accommodate the purchaser for a few days and it would sound ill for the mortgagor to derive benefit from the purchaser's default on a contract to which he was not party; Bloodstock v Emerton confirms late payment does not matter where vendor and purchaser do not insist on strict compliance. Platt JA similarly held the equity is lost on the fall of the hammer even if time was of the essence, unless the mortgagee wishes to set aside the sale for non-payment.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • An interlocutory judge must not make final findings of fact on disputed affidavits; the correct approach is to weigh the relative strength of each side's case and, in case of doubt, consider the balance of convenience.
  • A mortgagee exercising the power of sale owes a duty to take reasonable care to obtain the best possible price which the circumstances permit, owed to both himself and the mortgagor.
  • Under the Registered Land Act, the equity of redemption is extinguished when a binding contract of sale is concluded (a bid accepted at auction), not upon registration.
  • An unrepresented litigant should be given latitude, especially in technical areas of law such as mortgages.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal allowed
  2. 2.Orders of the High Court refusing the temporary injunction set aside
  3. 3.Temporary injunction granted as prayed, on the conditions imposed by the Court's order dated 27th June 1986
  4. 4.Written undertaking in damages to be filed by Thursday noon of the following week and monthly instalments of Shs. 8,000/- or more to continue to be paid as from 21st July 1988, failing which the injunction to be discharged unless otherwise ordered
  5. 5.Costs of the appeal awarded to the Appellant
  6. 6.Suit to be listed for early hearing in the High Court

The bench

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Judges wrote separately. A dissent does not bind; a concurrence may narrow the ratio.

majority

Wrote the judgment

Platt JA delivered the leading majority judgment. He held that under section 77 of the Registered Land Act the mortgagee must act in good faith and have regard to the mortgagor's interests, and that the Cuckmere/Standard Chartered line of authority imposes a duty to take reasonable care to obtain the true market value. He held the learned Judge below misdirected himself by making final findings of fact on disputed affidavits at the interlocutory stage, and that the correct approach was to weigh the strength of each side's case and seek the balance of convenience, which favours granting an injunction in land disputes. He would allow the appeal, set aside the High Court orders and substitute an injunction on the conditions previously imposed by the Court.

I would allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court, and substitute therefor an order granting the injunction as prayedp. 5
concurring

Wrote the judgment

Masime Ag JA agreed with Platt and Apaloo JJA that the equity of redemption is extinguished the moment a valid contract is concluded in exercise of the statutory power of sale. However, in view of section 163 of the Registered Land Act, he took the view that the legislature must have intended to delay extinction of the equity of redemption through the provision in section 77(4). On that basis he concluded the appellant was entitled to a full opportunity to be heard on the objection of fraud rather than being put out by an interlocutory decision, and agreed with Platt JA that the appeal should be allowed with costs and with the interim injunction granted.

In view of this provision it is my view that the legislature must have meant to delay the extinction of the equity of redemption by the provision in section 77(4) of the Registered Land Act.p. 6
dissenting

Wrote the judgment

Apaloo JA dissented. He held that no fresh statutory notice was required after suspension of a sale to accommodate the mortgagor (following Wood v Murton); that under section 72(1) of the Registered Land Act the equity of redemption is extinguished when a bid is accepted at auction, distinguishing the Kariuki case which arose under the Indian Transfer of Property Act; that no setting aside is possible against a bona fide purchaser for value, irregularities sounding only in damages under section 77(3); and that there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud in a properly conducted auction. He would have dismissed the appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings granted in June 1986, with costs to both respondents.

I would dismiss this appeal and set aside the order of "stay of proceedings" granted by this Court in June 1986 with costs to both respondents.p. 18
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya
Not stated in judgment
Jurisdiction invoked
Appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over an interlocutory appeal from the High Court

Relief refused

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Final nullification of the auction sale and setting aside of the sale (the substantive claim)

This was a matter for the trial court; the Court only granted interlocutory relief and found a dispute of fact to be resolved at trial

p. 2

Costs

Costs of the appeal awarded to the Appellant

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

I would allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court, and substitute therefor an order granting the injunction as prayed, on the conditions that this Court ordered in its order dated 27th June 1986.
p. 5Final orders - appeal allowed and injunction substituted
I would order that the costs of the appeal be the Appellant's costs. It is hoped that the High Court can arrange an early hearing of this suit.
p. 5Final orders - costs and early hearing
The correct approach in dealing with an application for the injunction is not to decide the issues of fact, but rather to weigh up the relevant strength of each side's propositions.
p. 4Interlocutory injunction principles
Ideas of finalising disputes at the interlocutory stage should never come to mind, unless the parties, by agreement, have asked the Court to treat the application as the hearing of the suit.
p. 5Interlocutory decisions must not be final trials
If the Mortgagor seeks relief promptly, a sale will be set aside if there is fraud, or if the price is so low as to be in itself evidence of fraud, but not on the grounds of undervalue alone
p. 2Setting aside a mortgagee's sale
In view of this provision it is my view that the legislature must have meant to delay the extinction of the equity of redemption by the provision in section 77(4) of the Registered Land Act.
p. 6Masime Ag JA - section 77(4) and the equity of redemption
I would dismiss this appeal and set aside the order of "stay of proceedings" granted by this Court in June 1986 with costs to both respondents.
p. 18Apaloo JA dissenting disposition

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment inconsistently states the original loan figure: the majority judgment states the Plaintiff borrowed Kshs 210,000/- in February 1986, while Apaloo JA's dissenting judgment states the appellant borrowed Kshs 21,000/- in February 1982.

minor

Apaloo JA's dissenting judgment contains an internal tension: he first records unanimity among the judges on matters of law, yet he dissents on the disposition granting the injunction.

minor

The property number is stated inconsistently: the majority refers to Nairobi/Block 73/225 while Apaloo JA refers to No. L.R. Nairobi/Block 73/25.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (7)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Mbuthia v Jimba Credit Finance Corporation & another [1988] KECA 116 (KLR)", Case Analysis (1988). Civil Appeal (from refusal of temporary injunction by Schofield J). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1988/116/eng@1988-07-12

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.