Skip to content
AI-generated case briefs sourced from Kenya Law · Not legal advice
AI-generated case brief
Case Brief · caselaw.co.ke
Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal 342 of 2000

GIRO COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED vs HALID HAMAD MUTESI [2002] KECA 158 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
18 January 2002
718 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~3 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

#

Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled that a borrower who admits owing money cannot stop a bank selling pledged property by disputing valuation or sale details.

What this practically means

#

Executive summary

#
This was an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeal at Malindi against a ruling of the superior court (Mrs. Khaminwa, Commissioner of Assize) granting an injunction restraining Giro Commercial Bank Limited from selling by auction or private treaty the respondent's Plot No. L.R. 3156, Section 1, M.N. Mombasa, charged to secure a loan, pending the hearing of Mombasa H.C.C.C. No. 205 of 2000. The respondent admitted indebtedness of Shs.9,134,486/65 as at 18th March 1999 and was not servicing the loan; the statutory notice under Section 69(1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and the 45-day notice to redeem were not disputed. The respondent's only complaints were that no proper valuation was carried out (his figure of Shs.13,000,000 against the auctioneer's forced-sale figure of Shs.11,000,000) and that the notification of sale misdescribed the property by omitting that construction was complete. The Court of Appeal, in a single judgment of the court delivered by Kwach, Shah and Ole Keiwua, JJA, held that a mortgagee cannot be restrained from exercising the power of sale merely because the amount due is in dispute or the mortgagor objects to the manner of sale, and that the respondent had failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success under the first Giella v Cassman Brown principle. The appeal was allowed, the injunction of 30th May 2000 was set aside, the respondent's application was dismissed with costs, and the appellant received the costs of the appeal.

Questions the Court framed

#

The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the superior court erred in granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the mortgagee from selling the charged property by auction or private treaty pending trial
  2. 2.Whether the respondent established a prima facie case with a probability of success under the Giella v Cassman Brown principles, given that the debt was admitted and due but the valuation and description of the property in the notification of sale were disputed

Key legal issues

#
01

Whether disputes over valuation and description of the charged property justify restraining a mortgagee's exercise of the power of sale

Holding

No. Complaints that the property was undervalued for a forced sale or misdescribed in the notification of sale do not amount to a prima facie case where the debt is admitted and due; the injunction was wrongly granted.

Reasoning

The court found the only disputes raised were the valuation (respondent's Shs.13,000,000 versus the auctioneer's forced-sale figure of Shs.11,000,000) and the alleged misdescription that the building's construction was complete. On the admitted facts - an acknowledged debt of Shs.9,134,486/65, non-servicing of the loan, and due statutory notice under Section 69(1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act - the respondent could not satisfy the first Giella principle, so the Commissioner of Assize erred in granting the injunction.

p. 2

Legal principles established

#
  • A mortgagee cannot be restrained from exercising the power of sale merely because the amount due is in dispute, the mortgagor has commenced a redemption action, or the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is arranged.
  • Where the debt is admittedly due and the loan is not being serviced, an interlocutory injunction restraining the mortgagee's sale should not be granted, as the mortgagor will have failed to demonstrate a prima facie case with a probability of success.

Court orders

#
  1. 1.The order of injunction made on 30th May 2000 is set aside
  2. 2.The respondent's application dated 24th April 2000, filed on 25th April 2000, is dismissed with costs
  3. 3.The appellant is awarded the costs of this appeal

The bench

#

One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya (superior court, Commissioner of Assize)
Mombasa H.C.C.C. No. 205 of 2000 (ruling and order of 30th May 2000)
Jurisdiction invoked
Interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeal under its appellate jurisdiction (statutory right of appeal from an interlocutory order of the superior court; specific provision not stated in the judgment)

Relief refused

#

The respondent's interlocutory injunction restraining sale of the suit property

The respondent failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success; a mortgagee cannot be restrained from exercising the power of sale merely because the amount due is in dispute or the mortgagor objects to the manner of sale

p. 2

Costs

The respondent's application dated 24th April 2000 is dismissed with costs, and the appellant will also have the costs of this appeal.

Quotable passages

#

Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

It has been held time and again that a mortgagee cannot be restrained from exercising his power of sale because the amount due is in dispute, or that the mortgagor has commenced a redemption action or because the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is being arranged.
p. 1Restraint of mortgagee's power of sale
In view of the admitted facts, and in view of the fact that the debt was admittedly due and further that the loan was not being serviced, the superior court should not have granted the injunction.
p. 2Interlocutory injunction against mortgagee where debt admitted
In the circumstances this appeal is allowed. The order of injunction made on 30th May, 2000, is hereby set aside; the respondent's application dated 24th April, 2000 filed on 25th April, 2000 is dismissed with costs. The appellant will also have the costs of this appeal.
p. 2Final orders and disposition

Key timeline

#

Practical implications

#

Frequently asked questions

#

Cite this brief

#

Cite this brief

Caselaw, "GIRO COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED vs HALID HAMAD MUTESI [2002] KECA 158 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2002). Civil Appeal 342 of 2000. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2002/158/eng@2002-01-18

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.