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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Application No. Nai. 1 of 2003

Anspar Beverages Limited v Development Bank of Kenya Limited,East African Development Bank, International Finance Corporation,Abn Amro Bank N.V [2003] KECA 117 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
14 February 2003
1,573 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal stopped a company in receivership's assets from being sold, ruling its appeal over who authorised the lawsuit was arguable.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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Anspar Beverages Limited sued six respondents, including four financial institutions and two receivers/managers, to restrain disposal of its assets and to obtain declarations that its loan contracts and debentures had been frustrated. Ringera J struck out the suit on a preliminary point of law that it was brought without the authority of the company, no organ of the company having conferred authority on Mr Arvind Tanna to sue. Anspar lodged a notice of appeal and applied to the Court of Appeal under Rule 5(2)(b) for an injunction pending the intended appeal. The court (Shah, Bosire and Owuor JJ.A) found the appeal arguable on two bases: first, the learned judge had erred in reasoning that the absence of a traversal in a reply to defence mattered, since Order VI rule 10(1) provides joinder of issue on the defence without a reply; secondly, on a preliminary point of law the facts stated by affidavit, including Mr Tanna's assertion that he was duly authorized, had to be presumed correct, per Mukisa Biscuit. The court also noted the established principle that a company in receivership may sue to challenge the receivership without the receiver's consent. On the nugatory limb, counsel for the respondents conceded that a sale of the plant, machinery and land to third parties would leave nothing for the applicant to recover. The court rejected the submission that no suit existed to protect, holding the intended appeal sought reinstatement of the plaint. It allowed the second prayer, granted the injunction, and made costs of the application costs in the intended appeal.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the applicant had an arguable intended appeal from the striking out of its suit
  2. 2.Whether the appeal, if successful, would be rendered nugatory if the injunction sought were not granted

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the intended appeal challenging the striking out of the suit for want of authority was arguable

Holding

The court found arguable points: the defence puts matters in issue without need of a reply, and the applicant's affidavits asserting authorization should have been presumed correct on a preliminary point of law.

Reasoning

The judge had held the suit invalid because no organ of the company authorized it, relying on the absence of traversal in a reply. The Court of Appeal held that Order VI rule 10(1) makes a defence self-proving so no reply is needed, and that on a preliminary point of law the facts asserted by affidavit, including authorization by Mr Tanna, had to be presumed correct per Mukisa Biscuit. This made the appeal arguable.

p. 3
02

Whether success in the intended appeal would be rendered nugatory without the injunction

Holding

Counsel for the respondents conceded that if the plant, machinery and land were sold to third parties, nothing would remain for the applicant to fight for; the nugatory test was satisfied.

Reasoning

Both counsel for the first and second respondents and for the receivers/managers conceded that a sale of the assets to third parties would leave the applicant with nothing to recover even if the appeal succeeded. The court therefore found the second limb of the Rule 5(2)(b) test met and granted the injunction to preserve the assets.

p. 3
03

Whether the injunction could be refused because the plaint had been struck out and no suit existed

Holding

The court rejected the submission that no suit existed, since the intended appeal sought to resurrect the plaint, in which event the chamber summons could be argued on its merits.

Reasoning

Counsel for the third respondent argued there was no suit to protect because the plaint was struck out. The court held this misunderstood the position: on a successful appeal the plaint could be reinstated and the pending application argued, so preserving the status quo pending appeal was appropriate.

p. 3

Legal principles established

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  • A company cannot institute a suit in its own name unless the action has been sanctioned by the board of directors or the company in general or special meeting, evidenced by a resolution.
  • A company in receivership may sue to challenge the receivership without the permission or consent of the receiver.
  • A preliminary objection in law is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct.
  • Where there is no reply to a defence, there is joinder of issue on that defence; what is pleaded in defence need not be traversed in a reply.
  • For an injunction under Rule 5(2)(b) to issue, the applicant must show an arguable appeal and that the appeal would be rendered nugatory if not granted.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Injunction granted in terms of the second prayer of the application under Rule 5(2)(b) pending the filing, hearing and determination of the intended appeal, the first prayer having been spent
  2. 2.Costs of the application to be costs in the intended appeal

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
H.C.C.C. No. 1155 of 2002
Jurisdiction invoked
Rule 5(2)(b) of the Court of Appeal Rules - injunction pending the filing, hearing and determination of an intended appeal

Relief refused

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Evaluation of the merits or demerits of the pending chamber summons application before the superior court

The court held it would be premature to evaluate the merits of the application still pending before the High Court

p. 3

Costs

The costs of this application will be costs in the intended appeal.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

We allow the second prayer of the application, the first prayer being spent. The costs of this application will be costs in the intended appeal.
p. 3Final orders - injunction granted and costs
A preliminary objection in law is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct
p. 3Preliminary objections - facts presumed correct
a company in receivership could sue to challenge the said receivership without the permission or consent of the receiver
p. 2Company in receivership - locus to sue
10(1) If there is no reply to defence, there is joinder of issue on that defence
p. 3Joinder of issue without reply to defence
As the injunction application is still pending we cannot start our own evaluation of the merits or demerits of the application before the superior court.
p. 3Limits of Rule 5(2)(b) jurisdiction - no evaluation of merits below

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (4)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Anspar Beverages Limited v Development Bank of Kenya Limited,East African Development Bank, International Finance Corporation,Abn Amro Bank N.V [2003] KECA 117 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2003). Civil Application No. Nai. 1 of 2003. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2003/117/eng@2003-02-14

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.