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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 318 of 2013

Uchumi Supermarket Ltd v Toigoi Investment Limited [2016] KECA 104 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
29 July 2016
6,233 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal cut Uchumi Supermarket's fire damage bill from Kshs. 37.3 million to Kshs. 22.5 million but still held it liable for negligence.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This appeal arose from a fire that broke out on 11th December 1998 in premises leased to Uchumi Supermarket Ltd within Toigoi Investment Limited's Eldo Centre building in Eldoret. The High Court (M. K. Ibrahim, J.) found the appellant liable in negligence and awarded the respondent special damages of Kshs. 37,251,960.00, comprising 35% of the building's value for reconstruction, loss of rent for twelve months, and debris removal costs, with Kshs. 12,369,952 payable to Kenindia Assurance in subrogation. The Court of Appeal (Musinga, Gatembu Kairu and Murgor, JJ.A) affirmed the finding of negligence, holding that on the evidence - particularly the forensic expert's testimony about a cooking stove found at the back of the store - it was more probable than not that the fire was caused by the negligence of the appellant's employees. However, the Court held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply, since fires can occur accidentally without negligence, and that Section 3 of The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774 protects only against accidental fires, not fires caused by negligence. On quantum, the Court found the Judge erred in awarding 35% of the building's value when no such relief was pleaded; it substituted the Kshs. 17,500,000.00 estimate based on priced Bills of Quantities, reduced loss of rent to ten months (Kshs. 3,543,330.00), and upheld the debris award. The total award was reduced to Kshs. 22,543,330.00 with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of the High Court judgment, given the four-year delay in its delivery. The appellant was granted half the costs of the appeal; the respondent retained the costs of the suit in the High Court. The appeal therefore partially succeeded.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the defendant established that the fire was caused by the negligence of the appellant
  2. 2.Whether the respondent contributed to the damage caused to the building
  3. 3.Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the circumstances of the case
  4. 4.Whether the appellant was exempted from liability under Section 3 of The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774
  5. 5.Whether the awards for damages made to the respondent are sustainable

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the fire was caused by the appellant's negligence

Holding

Yes. The trial Judge's finding that the fire was caused by the negligence of the appellant's employees using a cooking stove was amply supported by the evidence and not perverse, so it stands.

Reasoning

The Court reviewed the testimony of the Chief Fire Officer, a tenant, a loss adjuster, a forensic expert (PW12) and the respondent's director, all of which pointed to a stove found at the back of the store and cooking activities during the lunch hour. Applying the balance-of-probabilities standard under Section 107 of the Evidence Act, the Court held it more probable than not that the unextinguished fire at the stove area caused the blaze. The appellant's failure to call the employees in that section to rebut the explanation weighed against it.

p. 7
02

Whether res ipsa loquitur applied

Holding

No. Although the Court upheld liability, it held that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because fires can occur accidentally without negligence.

Reasoning

All the witnesses accepted that a fire can occur accidentally without negligence. Relying on Sochacki v Sas, where Lord Goddard refused to apply the doctrine, and on H & N Emanuel Ltd v Greater London Council on spontaneous combustion, the Court held that the mere occurrence of a fire does not invariably raise a presumption of negligence. The inference of negligence could not be drawn from the circumstances alone; liability was sustained instead on direct proof on a balance of probabilities.

p. 7
03

Whether Section 3 of The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774 exempted the appellant

Holding

No. The statutory immunity applies only to accidental fires, not fires caused by negligence.

Reasoning

The Court endorsed the trial Judge's reliance on the English authority H & N Emanuel Ltd v Greater London Council, holding that the proviso in Section 3 covers only fires that begin or spread by accident without negligence. Since the cause of the fire was established to be negligence, the appellant could not invoke the protection of the 1774 Act, which is an English statute of general application in Kenya.

p. 7
04

Whether the damages awards were sustainable

Holding

Partly. The award of 35% of the building's value (Kshs. 31,500,000.00) was set aside as unsupported by the pleadings and evidence and replaced with the Kshs. 17,500,000.00 reinstatement estimate; loss of rent was reduced to 10 months; debris removal was upheld.

Reasoning

No claim had been pleaded for a percentage of the building's value; the pleaded claim was for reconstruction costs. Of the competing estimates, the Kshs. 17,500,000.00 figure based on priced Bills of Quantities for reinstatement of the fire damage was the most accurate. The 12-month loss-of-rent award was reduced to 10 months, consistent with the contractors' completion estimates of 35 and 45 weeks. The Kshs. 1,500,000.00 debris claim was specially proved.

p. 9
05

Interest on special damages given the delayed judgment

Holding

Interest was to run from the date of the High Court judgment rather than the date of filing suit, because the delay of over four years in delivering judgment was not the parties' fault.

Reasoning

Although interest on special damages ordinarily runs from the date of filing suit, the Court considered the more than four-year delay in delivering the High Court judgment. Since that delay occurred for reasons for which the parties were not responsible, it would be unjust to burden the appellant with interest accruing over that period; interest should accrue from the date of delivery of the judgment on 31st October 2012 until payment in full.

p. 10

Legal principles established

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  • Section 3 of The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774 protects only against accidental fires; it affords no protection where the fire is caused by negligence.
  • The occurrence of a fire does not invariably give rise to an inference of negligence; res ipsa loquitur does not apply merely because a fire broke out, since fires can occur accidentally without negligence.
  • An appellate court may only interfere with a trial court's findings of fact if they are unsupported by, or perverse on, the evidence.
  • A party cannot raise contributory negligence for the first time on appeal where it was not pleaded or canvassed before the trial court.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Set aside the trial Judge's award of Kshs. 31,500,000.00 for reconstruction and substitute an award of Kshs. 17,500,000.00
  2. 2.Substitute the award of Kshs. 4,251,960.00 for loss of rent with an award of Kshs. 3,543,330.00 (10 months at Kshs. 354,330.00 per month)
  3. 3.Uphold the award of Kshs. 1,500,000.00 for removal of debris
  4. 4.Substitute the total award of special damages of Kshs. 37,251,960.00 with an award of Kshs. 22,543,330.00
  5. 5.Order interest at 12% p.a. from the date of delivery of the High Court judgment on 31/10/2012 until payment in full, instead of from the date of filing suit
  6. 6.Direct payment of Kshs. 12,369,952.00 to Kenindia Assurance Company Ltd in settlement of the subrogation claim as ordered by the High Court
  7. 7.Award the respondent the costs of the suit in the High Court
  8. 8.Award the appellant half the costs of the appeal

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority

Wrote the judgment

majority

Wrote the judgment

majority

Wrote the judgment

On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Eldoret
HCCC No. 164 of 2000
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction over the High Court under the Constitution and Appellate jurisdiction Act (not expressly stated in the judgment)

Relief refused

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Apportionment of loss on the basis of contributory negligence

Raised for the first time on appeal; not pleaded nor canvassed before the High Court

p. 10

Application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

Fires can occur accidentally without negligence, so the occurrence of a fire does not invariably raise a presumption of negligence

p. 7

Costs

The respondent shall have the costs of the suit in the High Court; half costs of the appeal are awarded to the appellant as it partially succeeded.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

In conclusion, the Judgment of the High Court awarding the respondent Kshs.37,251,960/= is hereby set aside and substituted with Judgment in favour of the respondent against the appellant for Kshs.22,543,330/= only.
p. 10Final orders - substituted judgment amount
Out of the judgment amount, Kshs. 12,369,952.00 together with interest at 12% p.a from the date of delivery of the Judgment in the High Court on 31/10/2012 until payment in full will be paid to Kenindia Assurance Company Ltd in settlement of subrogation claim as ordered by the High Court.
p. 10Final orders - subrogation payment and interest
The appellant shall pay the respondent's costs of the suit in the High Court. Half costs of the appeal are awarded to the appellant.
p. 10Final orders - costs
we can only interfere with the trial court's findings on those issues if we are satisfied that those findings are perverse as not being supported by evidence or that they are not supportable on the evidence on record
p. 5Appellate standard of interference with findings of fact
That authority stands for the proposition that Section 3 of The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774 "covers all cases where fire begins or spreads by accident without negligence."
p. 7Scope of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 immunity
It cannot therefore be said that the occurrence of a fire must invariably lead to the inference of negligence.
p. 7Limits of res ipsa loquitur in fire cases

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment inconsistently records the Kenindia subrogation amount: paragraph 5 states the insurer indemnified the appellant for Kshs. 12,369,052, while the consent recorded at trial and the final orders refer to Kshs. 12,369,952.

minor

The respondent's pleaded claim for loss of rent is stated at Kshs. 372,000.00 per month, but the judgment awarded Kshs. 354,330.00 per month without reconciling the figures.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Later judgments citing this (1)

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Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.

Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Uchumi Supermarket Ltd v Toigoi Investment Limited [2016] KECA 104 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2016). Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2013. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2016/104/eng@2016-07-29

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.