Attorney General v Law Society of Kenya & another (Civil Appeal 133 of 2011) [2017] KECA 176 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal struck down only two parts of the Work Injuries Benefits Act, leaving most of the law intact for workplace injury claims.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Questions the Court framed
#The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.
- 1.Whether the learned Judge erred in declaring nine sections of the Work Injuries Benefits Act, 2007 inconsistent with the former Constitution
- 2.Whether section 7 (Minister's approval/exemption of insurers) violates freedom of association
- 3.Whether section 10(4) imposing strict liability is unconstitutional
- 4.Whether sections 16 and 23(1) unlawfully divest judicial power from the courts and vest it in the Director
- 5.Whether section 25(1) and (3) is discriminatory
- 6.Whether section 52(1)(2) is discriminatory in granting a right of appeal only to an objector
- 7.Whether section 58(2) retrospectively depriving claimants of pending court suits is unconstitutional
Key legal issues
#Ministerial approval of insurers under section 7 of the Act
The requirement that an employer take insurance only from an insurer approved by the Minister unconstitutionally limits freedom of association and is an unjustifiable micro-management of the free market
While workers' compensation insurance is a progressive and beneficial idea, the Government cannot dictate to employers from which insurer to take the policy. Sufficient regulatory measures exist under the Insurance Act through the IRA. The approval requirement conflicts with section 80 of the former Constitution and Article 36 of the 2010 Constitution on freedom of association. The role of the Executive is limited to ensuring compliance with the law, not micro-managing implementation.
Strict liability under section 10(4)
Section 10(4)(a) and (b) is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, eliminating the employer's defences where the employee acted unlawfully or without instruction
The Court disagreed with the High Court's reliance on section 77 (fair trial for criminal charges) but agreed the section fails. Where an employee is injured through willful misconduct, criminal acts or contrary to instructions, the employer must be free to raise defences of illegality or contributory negligence, consistent with the ex turpi causa principle. Strict liability in the Rylands v Fletcher sense has no application as there is no liability without fault in Kenya. The section fails under Article 47 on fair administrative action as arbitrary in its terms.
Sections 16 and 23(1) - adjudication by the Director and bar on court actions
Sections 16, 23(1) and 52(2) are constitutional; the Director's adjudicative powers are donated by statute, circumscribed, and not arbitrary, and the statutory procedure must be strictly followed
The Court held that where a clear procedure for redress of a particular grievance is prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, it should be strictly followed, citing the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia and Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume. The Director's powers of inquiry, award and review are legitimate, subject to review and an appeal to the Employment and Labour Relations Court. The High Court's invalidation of these sections was therefore in error.
Section 25 medical examination
Section 25(1) and (3) is not discriminatory; it provides equality of arms by allowing the employee a medical practitioner of choice at examination
The learned Judge invalidated section 25 without giving reasons, and neither the memorandum of appeal nor the parties' submissions addressed it. Nonetheless, exercising its first appellate powers, the Court held that subsection (3) gives the employee the option of having a medical practitioner of his choice present during an examination by a designated practitioner, so no party is discriminated against. It was in error to strike it down for conflicting with section 82 of the former Constitution.
Section 52(1)(2) - right of appeal only for the objector
Section 52(2) is not unconstitutional; the one-sided right of appeal is a pure drafting error amendable by Parliament, not an inconsistency with the Constitution
The subsection grants a right of appeal to the Industrial Court only to an objector, not to the affected party. Applying legislative intent, the Court could see no reason why in adversarial litigation only one party would have a right of appeal, but it considered this a pure drafting error that does not offend the Constitution and which Parliament can easily amend. The learned Judge's finding of discrimination under section 82 was accordingly set aside.
Section 58(2) - retrospective conversion of pending claims
Section 58(2) is not in itself inconsistent with the Constitution, but requires further consideration for a smooth transition; pending claims enjoy protection under section 23 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and legitimate expectation
Claimants with pending cases under the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act or common law have legitimate expectations their cases would be concluded under the judicial process invoked. The legislative practice when a new judicial forum replaces an existing system is to finalize pending proceedings in the previous forum, as under section 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act and section 30(2) of the Environment and Land Court Act. Section 23 of the Interpretation Act preserves prior rights and obligations. The High Court's invalidation of section 58(2) was set aside.
Legal principles established
#- Sections 7 (in so far as Ministerial approval/exemption of insurers) and 10(4) of the Work Injuries Benefits Act, 2007 are inconsistent with the former and current Constitution, and the declarations of invalidity in respect of sections 4, 16, 21(1), 23(1), 25(1)(3), 52(1)(2) and 58(2) are set aside
- Where a clear procedure for redress of a particular grievance is prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure must be strictly followed; a statutory forum such as the Director's adjudicative powers under the Act are legitimate
- In a free market economy the Government cannot dictate from which approved insurer an employer must take an insurance policy; such compulsion limits freedom of association under section 80 of the former Constitution and Article 36 of the 2010 Constitution
- Every statute enjoys a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality and the onus of rebutting it rests on those who challenge the legislation
- Both purpose and effect are relevant in determining the constitutionality of legislation; either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation
- There is as yet no liability without fault in the Kenyan legal system; strict liability of the Rylands v Fletcher kind has no application to employer liability for workplace injuries
Court orders
#- 1.Appeal allowed to the extent that the High Court's orders declaring sections 4, 16, 21(1), 23(1), 25(1)(3), 52(1)(2) and 58(2) inconsistent with the former Constitution are set aside
- 2.Sections 7 (in so far as it provides for the Minister's approval or exemption) and 10(4) of the Work Injuries Benefits Act remain inconsistent with the former and current Constitution
- 3.No orders as to costs
The bench
#One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Constitution and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (court exercising its powers as a first appellate court)
Relief refused
#Nullification of sections 16, 23(1), 25(1)(3), 52(1)(2) and 58(2)
Court found those provisions not inconsistent with the Constitution; defects were drafting errors amendable by Parliament or lawful statutory adjudicative schemes
Costs
There will be no orders as to costs.
Quotable passages
#Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.
In the end, we allow the appeal to the extent that we set aside the learned Judge's orders declaring sections 4, 16, 21 (1), 23(1), 25 (1) (3), 52 (1) (2) and 58(2) to be inconsistent with the former Constitution. The result is that only sections 7 (in so far as it provides for the Minister's approval or exemption) and 10 (4) are inconsistent with the former and current Constitution.
There will be no orders as to costs.
where there is a clear procedure for the redress of anyparticular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed
there was a rebuttable presumption that legislation was constitutional, and…the onus of rebutting the presumption rested on those who challenged the legislation's status
we do not, however, think that in a free market economy the Government can dictate to employers from which insurer they must take the policy.
there is as yet no liability without fault in the legal systemin Kenya, and a plaintifi must prove some negligence against the defendant where the claim is based on negligence
This Constitution is the Constitution of the Republic ofKenya and shall have the force of law throughout Kenya and, subject to section 47, if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void
Issues in the judgment
#The judgment inconsistently records the impugned provisions, referring in places to section 53(2) and section 52(2) and noting section 21(1) 'does not exist and was not among the sections challenged in the petition', yet the final orders set aside the declaration in respect of section 21(1)
The petition's challenge (paragraph 3(d)) is vague, citing a section without number, and the High Court is recorded as invalidating section 4 although the petition did not challenge it
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Later judgments citing this (3)
#Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.
- Omari v Kenya Ports Authority (Miscellaneous Application E025 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 1068 (KLR)[2025] KEELRC 1068 (KLR)3 Apr 2025
- Omari v Kenya Ports Authority (Miscellaneous Application E025 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 1068 (KLR)[2025] KEELRC 1068 (KLR)3 Apr 2025applied
- Musyimi v Kenya Suitcase Manufacturers Limited (Appeal E148 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 784 (KLR)[2025] KEELRC 784 (KLR)6 Mar 2025followed
Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Attorney General v Law Society of Kenya & another (Civil Appeal 133 of 2011) [2017] KECA 176 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2017). Civil Appeal (Nairobi). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2017/176/eng@2017-11-17
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.