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Court of AppealPartially AllowedCivil Appeal No. 31 of 2017

Aharub Ebrahim Khatiri v Nelson Marwa & another [2018] KECA 16 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
28 February 2018
2,381 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal ruled you cannot remove a named public officer from a defamation case before trial, because good faith can only be tested with him present.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The appellant sued Nelson Marwa, then Coast Regional Commissioner, for defamation over statements made at a press briefing following a police raid on his home. Before trial, Mwangi J. (ruling of 14 March 2017) struck out Marwa's name as defendant, joined the Attorney General as defendant, and granted the Department of Public Prosecutions leave to join as interested party. The appellant appealed against the striking out of Marwa's name, contending that a defamation claim is personal to the named speaker, while the Attorney General cross-appealed seeking dismissal of the entire suit on the ground that the in personam remedy could not survive without the individual defendant. The Court of Appeal (Visram, Karanja and Koome, JJ.A) unanimously allowed the appeal and disallowed the cross-appeal. It affirmed the joinder of the Attorney General and the DPP as correct, but held that striking out Marwa before trial was premature: the claim was predicated on words allegedly spoken by him, and issues of whether the words were uttered and whether his conduct was done in good faith under section 22 of the National Government Coordination Act required his participation. Invoking Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution, the Court held a party through whom a claim alone can be ventilated should not be removed from the seat of justice, noting that any damages would be settled by the state. The 1st defendant was restored to the proceedings, and costs of the appeal were made to abide the outcome of the civil suit.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the learned Judge erred in striking out the name of Nelson Marwa as defendant at a preliminary stage of the defamation suit
  2. 2.Whether the Attorney General and the DPP were properly joined as defendant and interested party respectively
  3. 3.Whether the cross-appeal seeking dismissal of the entire suit under the Government Proceedings Act should be allowed

Key legal issues

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01

Striking out a named defendant in a defamation claim before trial

Holding

It was premature and erroneous to strike out Nelson Marwa's name before the matter was heard, since the claim was predicated on words spoken by him and his participation is necessary to determine whether the words were uttered and whether the actions were done in good faith.

Reasoning

The claim was in personam and founded on words allegedly spoken by Marwa at a press briefing. The Judge herself found it difficult to determine whether the words were uttered by him. Without the named defendant, the court could not effectually and completely adjudicate, nor could the appellant demonstrate the connection between the spoken words and the Government through the Attorney General.

p. 3
02

Joinder of the Attorney General and the DPP

Holding

The learned Judge was correct to join the Attorney General as defendant and the DPP as interested party, and that part of the ruling is affirmed.

Reasoning

Claims for or against the Government are instituted against the Attorney General under section 12 of the Government Proceedings Act, and the investigations complained of were undertaken under the DPP's direction. Their presence was necessary for effectual adjudication under Order 1 Rule 10(2).

p. 3
03

Immunity of a public officer under the National Government Coordination Act

Holding

Section 22 immunity for acts done in good faith in execution of official duty does not automatically extinguish a defamation claim against the officer; the issues of the nature of the claim and good faith require his participation at trial.

Reasoning

The Court quoted section 22 of the National Government Coordination Act and accepted the 1st defendant enjoys immunity for actions in execution of public duty. However, whether the actions were carried out in good faith, and whether the state would be responsible for damages, are matters requiring the officer's presence in the proceedings.

p. 4
04

Cross-appeal for dismissal of the entire suit

Holding

The cross-appeal was disallowed; the suit remains sustainable with the 1st defendant back in the proceedings.

Reasoning

The AG argued that once the individual defendant was struck out, the in personam defamation remedy could no longer be sustained and the whole suit should be dismissed under section 40 of the Government Proceedings Act. The Court instead restored the 1st defendant, removing the premise of the cross-appeal, and held the state would settle any damages.

p. 4

Legal principles established

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  • A court may strike out or add parties under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, but where a claim in personam such as defamation is premised on words spoken by a named individual, that individual should not be removed from proceedings before trial where his presence is necessary for the court to effectually and completely adjudicate the matter and determine issues of good faith and official capacity.
  • Substantive justice under Articles 50 and 159 of the Constitution enjoins courts not to remove from the seat of justice a party through whom a claim can alone be ventilated, and immunity of a public officer does not justify striking him out before trial where questions of good faith and the connection to the Government remain to be determined.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is allowed
  2. 2.The name of Nelson Marwa is restored so that the 1st defendant remains in the proceedings
  3. 3.The cross-appeal by the Attorney General is disallowed
  4. 4.Costs of the appeal shall abide the outcome of the civil suit

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
Martha Karambu Koome
M.K. KoomeJA
Currently serving
majority
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Mombasa
HCCC No. 4 of 2017
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal under the Civil Procedure Act against an interlocutory ruling of the High Court

Relief refused

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Cross-appeal seeking dismissal of the entire defamation suit

The Court found the appeal had merit and for the same reasons disallowed the cross-appeal

p. 4

Costs

The costs of this appeal shall abide the outcome of the civil suit.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

For the aforesaid reasons we find merit in this appeal which we allow and for the same reasons we disallow the cross- appeal. The costs of this appeal shall abide the outcome of the civil suit.
p. 4Final orders and disposition
we agree in this regard the learned Judge erred by striking the name of Nelson Marwa too early before effectually hearing the matter.
p. 3Premature striking out of a named defendant
If the only way in which the appellant was to be able to ventilate his claim in a court of law was through the 1st defendant, in our view he should not be removed from the seat of justice
p. 4Substantive justice under Articles 50 and 159
However the nature of the claim and the issue of whether the actions were carried out in good faith all require the participation of the 1st defendant.
p. 4Public officer immunity and necessity of participation
We agree the learned Judge was spot on when she ordered the AG in whose name all civil claims for or against the government should be undertaken to be joined and also the DPP
p. 3Affirmance of joinder of AG and DPP

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment at paragraph 10 cites 'section 156 (d) of the Constitution' although section 156 is a statutory provision of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act and not a constitutional article; the reference appears to conflate the two.

minor

The coram spells the first judge's name 'VISRAM' while the signature block reads 'ALNASHIR VISRAM'.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Aharub Ebrahim Khatiri v Nelson Marwa & another [2018] KECA 16 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Civil Appeal No. 31 of 2017. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2018/16/eng@2018-02-28

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.