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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal No. 141 of 2016· [2018] KECA 338 (KLR)

Justus Mutiga & 2 others v Law Society of Kenya & another [2018] KECA 338 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
20 April 2018
6,258 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
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The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal struck down the insurer-backed cap on road accident compensation, confirming courts alone decide what accident victims are awarded.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Law Society of Kenya petitioned the High Court challenging six provisions of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act, Cap 405 and the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act 2013, arguing that the Kshs.3,000,000 compensation cap and the Structured Compensation schedule usurped judicial power and violated Articles 40, 47, 48 and 50 of the Constitution. Onguto J. allowed the petition in part, declaring sections 3(a), 3(b) and 6 of the Amendment Act unconstitutional but upholding section 5(b) of the Principal Act and sections 3(e) and 3(f). The Association of Kenya Insurers, joined as an interested party, appealed on the schedule alone. The Court of Appeal framed three issues: whether the schedule applies pre-judgment and compromises judicial authority; whether the limitation on recoverable amounts was justified; and whether the trial judge misapprehended the schedule's purpose. The court held that a decision becomes a judgment only upon delivery, so the schedule applies post-judgment, departing from the trial judge's reasoning on that point. However, because assessment of damages is a judicial function which cannot even be delegated to a Registrar, the schedule could not be incorporated into any judgment without rendering it a nullity; it was therefore unconstitutional. The limitation on recoverable amounts was unjustified and unsupported by evidence, leaving innocent third parties to pursue excess amounts personally from insureds. Section 5(b) was upheld as it caps only recovery from the insurer, not the court's award. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the Structured Compensation schedule applies pre-judgment and compromises judicial authority

Holding

The schedule applies post-judgment, since section 10 of the Principal Act presupposes claims based on court judgments. However, because assessment of damages is a judicial function that cannot be delegated, the schedule cannot be incorporated into any judgment without rendering it null and void; the High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of sections 3(a) and 6 was upheld.

Reasoning

The court held that a judgment exists only upon delivery, so the schedule operates post-judgment, contrary to the High Court's reasoning on that point. But computation of damages after pronouncement is a judicial function which cannot even be delegated to the Registrar. Any post-judgment interference with the judgment by anyone purporting to calculate percentages would render the judgment a nullity. The schedule therefore has no place in the Principal Act and is unconstitutional, vindicating the result reached by the High Court.

p. 6
02

Whether the limitation of the amounts recoverable under the schedule is justified

Holding

The limitation is unjustified. No evidence was adduced to prove justification; the cap leaves innocent third parties to recover the excess personally from insureds, defeating the objective of compulsory third party insurance.

Reasoning

The appellant argued the schedule balanced the interests of insurers, insureds and claimants and addressed insurer insolvency, drawing parallels with the Workmen's Compensation Act and Work Injury Benefits Act. The court found those statutes had not been raised at trial, and the evidence showed insolvency stemmed from many causes beyond compensation levels. Limiting compensation payable by the underwriter who received premiums, against an innocent third party armed with a court judgment, offends the very essence of insurance.

p. 7
03

Whether the learned Judge misapprehended the purpose and intention of the schedule

Holding

No. The court found no reason to interfere with the reasoned judgment of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.

Reasoning

The appellant contended the schedule provided an expeditious, cost-effective settlement mechanism and streamlined the industry. The court accepted that section 5(b) caps only recovery from the insurer, not the court's award, agreeing with the judge that section 5(b) is constitutional. But the schedule itself could not stand, as it compromises judicial authority post-judgment. On the whole the appeal was devoid of merit.

p. 7

Legal principles established

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  • The Structured Compensation schedule introduced under section 6 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) (Amendment) Act, 2013 applies post-judgment, but any post-judgment computation of damages awarded by a court is a judicial function that cannot be delegated; the schedule cannot be incorporated into any judgment without rendering it null and void.
  • Computation of monies awarded as damages is a judicial function which cannot be performed by the Registrar of the court or delegated; a judgment left incomplete for assessment is a nullity.
  • The cap under section 5(b) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicle Third Party Risks) Act limits only the amount recoverable from the insurer and does not fetter the court's discretion to award more, so section 5(b) is constitutional.
  • A decision only becomes a judgment upon delivery, and not before.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal is dismissed
  2. 2.No order as to costs
On appeal from
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi
Constitutional Petition No. 148 of 2014
Jurisdiction invoked
First appeal to the Court of Appeal under Rule 29(a) of the Court of Appeal Rules; constitutional petition appeal from the High Court

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Justus Mutiga & 2 others v Law Society of Kenya & another [2018] KECA 338 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2018). Civil Appeal No. 141 of 2016. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2018/338/eng@2018-04-20

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.