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Court of AppealDismissedCivil Appeal (interlocutory appeal from High Court, memorandum of appeal dated 6th November 2020)

Nanji & 2 others v Exobi (Finance House) Limited (Civil Appeal E434 of 2020) [2025] KECA 1119 (KLR)

Court of Appeal
20 June 2025
10,801 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~43 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding injunctions and asset-freezing orders protecting a majority shareholder excluded from a company's management.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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This is an interlocutory appeal by the 1st and 2nd appellants (directors of United Housing Estate Limited, joined by the company as 3rd appellant) against a High Court ruling granting Exobi (Finance House) Limited, the majority shareholder, interim and mareva injunctions and related preservatory orders following the death of Amirali Nanji. The appellants advanced 30 grounds condensed into five heads: that the trial court suo motu introduced the question of a derivative suit; made final findings at an interlocutory stage; misconstrued the conditions for mareva injunctions and receivers; and unduly interfered with the company's internal management. The Court of Appeal framed four issues. On the first, it agreed with the respondent that the trial court's derivative-suit discussion was obiter dictum that bore on neither the interim nor the mareva orders. On the core issue, applying Mbogo v Shah and United India Insurance v East African Underwriters, the Court held that the onus of justifying interference with discretion lies on the appellant and found none of the grounds established: the appellants had substantially admitted the impugned conduct (allotting shares to themselves, selling ABC shares to themselves, excluding the respondent from management, and ceasing dividends), establishing a prima facie case and irreparable harm not compensable in damages. The conditions for a mareva injunction were likewise met. No receiver had been appointed, so that issue was left for the trial court, and the order permitting the respondent's representative to attend board meetings was a proper exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent against the 1st and 2nd appellants.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.whether the trial court introduced a new issue for determination, namely, whether the respondent's claim was a derivative suit
  2. 2.whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting an interim and a mareva injunction to the respondent
  3. 3.whether the trial court misconstrued or misinterpreted the conditions and circumstances for the appointment of a receiver at an interlocutory stage
  4. 4.whether the trial court unduly and prematurely interfered with the internal management of UHE

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the trial court erred in raising, unilaterally, the question whether the suit was a derivative action

Holding

The trial court did raise and deal with an unpleaded issue, but its observation was obiter dictum that had no bearing on the interlocutory orders, so it furnished no ground of appeal.

Reasoning

Neither party pleaded or addressed the derivative-suit question. The trial court analysed section 238 of the Companies Act and observed the respondent could regularise the suit, but the observation formed no part of the disposition. The Court of Appeal adopted Halsbury's definition of dicta and held that, since the observation did not impact the decision to grant the interim or mareva injunctions, the appellants' complaint failed.

p. 13
02

Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting the interim and mareva injunctions

Holding

Yes. On largely uncontested facts - the allotment of shares to the directors without notice, the sale of ABC shares to themselves, denial of access to information and non-declaration of dividends - the discretion was properly exercised and the appellate court would not interfere.

Reasoning

Guided by Mbogo v Shah and United India Insurance, the Court found no misdirection, no misapprehension of facts, and no wrong decision. The admitted conduct of the 1st and 2nd appellants disclosed a prima facie case and irreparable harm in the form of diminution of the respondent's shareholding. The conditions for a mareva injunction - jurisdiction, good arguable case, assets within the jurisdiction, risk of dissipation and balance of convenience - were satisfied.

p. 17
03

Whether the trial court erred in declining to appoint a receiver and instead ordering appointment of the respondent's representative

Holding

No. No receiver was appointed; and the alternative order made in the court's inherent jurisdiction was not premature or an undue interference with the company's affairs.

Reasoning

The trial court considered the parties' arguments and Order 41 rule 1, found the company a going concern and declined to appoint a receiver, leaving the issue open. Expressing an opinion on it now would prejudice its hearing before the trial court. The order for a shareholder representative, made under inherent jurisdiction, was justified by the admitted exclusion of the majority shareholder from the company's management pending trial.

p. 17

Legal principles established

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  • An appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary decision unless the judge misdirected himself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account matters he should not have, failed to take into account matters he should have, or the decision is plainly wrong; the onus lies on the appellant.
  • On an interlocutory appeal, the appellate court must refrain from making concluded views on the matters in contention to avoid prejudicing the pending suit.
  • An appeal does not lie from obiter dictum observations of a judge that did not form part of the court's disposition or affect the ultimate decision.
  • Conditions for a temporary injunction: prima facie case with probability of success; irreparable injury not compensable by damages; and, if in doubt, balance of convenience.

Court orders

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  1. 1.Appeal dismissed
  2. 2.Costs awarded to the respondent against the 1st and 2nd appellants

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
majority
On appeal from
High Court
not stated in judgment
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the High Court (statutory basis not expressly stated in the judgment)

Relief refused

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Setting aside the interim injunction, mareva injunction and related interlocutory orders of the trial court

The trial court properly exercised its discretion on the largely uncontested facts; the appellants failed to discharge the onus of showing misdirection or that the decision was plainly wrong

p. 18

Interference with the trial court's order appointing a representative of the respondent to attend board meetings and be a signatory to company accounts

Exercise of inherent jurisdiction to include a central shareholder in the management pending hearing was neither premature nor undue interference

p. 18

Costs

Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent against the 1st and 2nd appellants

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

The Court of Appeal is only entitled to interfere if one or more of the following matters are established: first, that the Judge misdirected himself in law; secondly, that he misapprehended the facts; thirdly, that he took account of considerations of which he should not have taken account; fourthly, that he failed to take account of considerations of which he should have taken account, or fifthly, that his decision, albeit a discretionary one, is plainly wrong.
p. 14Interference with discretionary decisions
The onus of satisfying the Court that it should interfere with the exercise of discretion, we should add, always lies with the appellant.
p. 14Burden on appellant in discretionary appeals
We should, accordingly, refrain from making any concluded views on the matters in contention, to avoid prejudicing the suit pending before the trial court
p. 14Limits of interlocutory appellate determinations
We take the view that the trial court's consideration of and conclusion that the respondent's suit was a derivative one did not have a bearing on the decision to grant the interim or mareva injunctions.
p. 13Obiter dictum not a ground of appeal
Accordingly, we find that this appeal is without merit. It is hereby dismissed with costs to the respondent against the 1st and 2nd appellants.
p. 18Final orders and disposition

Issues in the judgment

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minor

Trial court ruling quoted in the judgment describes the company as 'United Housing Limited' in one order while elsewhere the company is 'United Housing Estate Limited', an apparent internal inconsistency in the trial court's orders reproduced verbatim.

minor

The judgment contains multiple typographical errors in quoted and original text (e.g. 'afiairs', 'efiect', 'Comgania Naviera'), likely OCR artefacts in the copy of the judgment provided.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Nanji & 2 others v Exobi (Finance House) Limited (Civil Appeal E434 of 2020) [2025] KECA 1119 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2025). Civil Appeal (interlocutory appeal from High Court, memorandum of appeal dated 6th November 2020). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2025/1119/eng@2025-06-20

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.