Jean Njeri Kamau v Association of Action Aid International & 2 others
The bottom line
#What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Key legal issues
#Scope of the confidentiality clause in the Separation Agreement
Clause 4.1 protected only the terms of the written Separation Agreement between its signatories; it did not extend to the internal audit draft, draft Board minutes or pre-agreement deliberations.
Clause 5 was a classic entire-agreement clause settling underlying disputes in full and final terms. Nothing in the Agreement integrated the audit draft or minutes by reference or directly. Importing those materials would contradict the Agreement's text and the parol-evidence rule. The Court, on its own re-evaluation, reached the same conclusion as the High Court.
Enforceability of institutional confidentiality policy by the appellant and privity
The Open Information Policy and Governance Manual imposed internal confidentiality on Board members, but any claim for breach belonged to the 2nd respondent, not the appellant personally; the 3rd respondent was not liable under Clause 4.1 for want of privity.
The trial judge's distinction between contractual (Agreement-based) and institutional (policy-based) confidentiality was sound. The 3rd respondent was not a party to the Separation Agreement and undertook no contractual obligation to the appellant, and no basis for an implied term binding him to her was laid.
Authorisation, facilitation and vicarious liability of the 1st and 2nd respondents
The appellant failed to prove that the 1st and 2nd respondents authorised or facilitated the 3rd respondent's Panel appearance; he appeared in a private capacity and vicarious liability could not attach.
The burden lay on the appellant. The letters showed the 2nd respondent authenticated the documents but stated the 3rd respondent did not act for it, and the 1st respondent disavowed external reliance on the audit draft. Reimbursement was for a Board retreat, not a mandate to appear before the Panel. No minute, letter, email or instruction linked them, and no employment/agency relationship or furtherance of their business was proved.
Defamation and injurious falsehood
Defamation was not proved: the appellant did not identify where the pleaded defamatory words appeared in the documents or prove any oral utterance, publication chain or causation of injury; injurious falsehood failed for the same evidential deficits.
The appellant advanced broad imputations but did not pinpoint the words in the draft audit report or minutes, nor prove any oral utterance. The chain of republication from the Panel to the press and its legal attribution to any respondent was not proved. The Panel Chair announced the documents would not be used, and the appellant ranked second overall. Defences of privilege, justification and public interest were therefore unnecessary to reach.
Exclusion of the Selection Panel member's evidence
The trial court's ruling excluding Lydia Gachoya under section 24 of the NPSC Act was not appealed and stands; it cannot be impugned collaterally.
The ruling was a final determination of that evidentiary question and was never challenged on appeal, so the appellant could not collaterally attack it in this appeal.
Legal principles established
#- A first appellate court must reconsider and evaluate the evidence and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind it did not see or hear the witnesses, and will not interfere with factual findings unless based on no evidence, misapprehension of the evidence, or wrong principles.
- A confidentiality clause protecting only 'the terms hereof' of an entire-agreement settlement cannot be extended by parol evidence to cover documents and negotiations outside the written agreement.
- Privity of contract defeats enforcement of a confidentiality clause against a third party who was not a party to the agreement and undertook no obligation to the plaintiff.
- A plaintiff in defamation must identify the specific words complained of, prove publication, that the words are defamatory of and concerning the plaintiff, and causation of injury; a court may not trawl documents to construct an unpleaded defamatory sting.
- A trial ruling not appealed stands and cannot be impugned collaterally in a subsequent appeal.
Court orders
#- 1.The appeal is dismissed
- 2.Each party shall bear its own costs in the High Court and on this appeal
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Naivasha
- HCCC No. 9 of 2018 (Formerly HCCC No. 278 of 2018)
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal's appellate jurisdiction (Constitution Article 164)
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Jean Njeri Kamau v Association of Action Aid International & 2 others", Case Analysis (2025). Civil Appeal E009 of 2020. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2025/2191/eng@2025-12-10
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.