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Court of AppealDismissedNot stated in the judgment

Middle East Bank Kenya Limited v Ngunjiri (Civil Appeal E019 of 2023) [2026] KECA 238 (KLR)

Court of Appeal of Kenya
13 February 2026
2,853 words in judgment
View original judgmentRead on Kenya Law Watch case
AI-assisted case brief
·~11 min to read original · ~4 min brief

The bottom line

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Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a suit dismissed for missing a hearing can be revived, because such dismissal is not a final judgment.

What this practically means

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Executive summary

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The Court of Appeal at Mombasa (A. K. Murgor, Dr. K. I. Laibuta and G. W. Ngenye-Macharia, JJA) dismissed an appeal by Middle East Bank Kenya Limited against a ruling of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (A. Nzei, J.) dated 8th December 2022, which set aside an order dismissing the respondent Gabriel Muraya Ngunjiri's claim for non-attendance at a virtual hearing and allowed the claim to proceed to trial. The appellant argued that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction because she had become functus officio upon dismissing the suit, and that section 12(3)(viii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act had to be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding subsections so as not to confer a power to set aside dismissal orders. The Court framed two issues: jurisdiction and discretionary power. On the first, adopting the Supreme Court's approval of the Pretorius formulation and Wong's substantive and formal aspects of finality, it held the dismissal for non-attendance was never a final decision on the merits, so the functus officio doctrine did not apply. On the second, it held section 12(3)(viii) is intentionally broad and, read with Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution and Article 159(2)(d), grounds the ELRC's discretion to set aside dismissal orders without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Applying the United India Insurance principles on interference with discretion, it found no error in the judge's exercise of discretion. The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent and the ruling below upheld.

Questions the Court framed

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The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.

  1. 1.Whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent's Motion, the appellant contending the trial court had become functus officio upon dismissing the suit for non-attendance
  2. 2.Whether the learned Judge had discretionary power to grant the orders sought, including reinstating the respondent's suit dismissed for non-attendance for hearing and determination on its merits

Key legal issues

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01

Whether the ELRC became functus officio upon dismissing the respondent's suit for non-attendance

Holding

The court held that functus officio did not apply because the dismissal for non-attendance was a procedural outcome, not a determination on the merits; the decision was neither substantively nor formally final, as no final judgment or order had been drawn up, issued and entered disposing of the claim.

Reasoning

Adopting the Pretorius formulation approved by the Supreme Court in Raila Odinga and Wong's two aspects of finality (substantive and formal), the court reasoned that the suit was dismissed only for a procedural infraction - a technical hitch in joining the virtual platform - and was never determined on its merits. Had it been so determined, the doctrine would have applied. The contention was therefore misconceived.

p. 4
02

Whether section 12(3)(viii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act confers power on the ELRC to set aside a dismissal order, or must be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding subsections

Holding

The court held that section 12(3)(viii) is intentionally broad, conferring wide discretionary powers to grant 'appropriate relief', which, read with Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution and Article 159(2)(d), encompasses setting aside dismissal orders without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The ejusdem generis argument was rejected.

Reasoning

Relying on Fose v Minister of Safety & Security on 'appropriate relief', the court linked that relief to the constitutional rights of access to justice and fair hearing. Article 159(2)(d) mandates administration of justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Section 12 as so read provides a firm foundation for the trial court's discretion to reinstate the dismissed suit.

p. 5
03

Whether the Court of Appeal should interfere with the learned Judge's discretionary decision to set aside the dismissal order

Holding

The court found no misdirection in law, misapprehension of facts, or wrong exercise of discretion, and declined to interfere with the trial court's decision, applying the classic principles in United India Insurance v East African Underwriters.

Reasoning

The court applied the five-limbed test from United India Insurance (Madan, JA) on interference with discretionary decisions. It found nothing to suggest the learned Judge erred on any limb: she did not misdirect herself in law, misapprehend the facts, take irrelevant considerations into account, omit relevant ones, or arrive at a plainly wrong decision.

p. 6

Legal principles established

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  • The functus officio doctrine does not bar a court from reinstating a suit dismissed for a procedural infraction such as non-attendance, since such a dismissal is not a final decision on the merits; the doctrine applies only where a final and valid decision has been made and a formal judgment or order drawn up, issued and entered.
  • Section 12(3)(viii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act, which empowers the ELRC to grant 'any other appropriate relief', is couched in broad terms and, read with Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, grounds the ELRC's discretion to set aside dismissal orders made for non-attendance.
  • An appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary decision of the judge appealed from unless the judge misdirected himself in law, misapprehended the facts, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant considerations, or the decision is plainly wrong.

Court orders

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  1. 1.The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to the respondent
  2. 2.The ruling and orders of the ELRC (A. Nzei, J.) dated 8th December 2022 are upheld

The bench

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One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.

majority
majority
On appeal from
Employment and Labour Relations Court
Not stated in the judgment
Jurisdiction invoked
First appellate jurisdiction under the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act; appeal against exercise of the ELRC's discretion under section 12(3)(viii) read with Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution

Relief refused

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The appellant's appeal seeking to set aside the ELRC's ruling reinstating the respondent's dismissed suit

The trial court was not functus officio, as the suit had never been determined on its merits, and the learned Judge's exercise of discretion disclosed no error warranting appellate interference

p. 6

Costs

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Quotable passages

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Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.

It is clear that the doctrine of functus oficio does not bar a court from entertaining a case it has already decided, but prevents it from revisiting the matter on a merit-based reengagement once final judgment has been entered and a decree issued, as is the case herein.
p. 4Scope of the functus officio doctrine
Functus oficio is an enduring principle of law that prevents the re-opening of a matter before a court that rendered the final decision thereon.
p. 4Definition of functus officio (Telkom Kenya, approved)
While we acknowledge the fact that the functus oficio doctrine retains its validity, even vitality …, it is our view that in certain situations, this doctrine ought to give way, albeit on a case by case basis.
p. 4Flexibility of the functus officio doctrine (Mitu-Bell, approved)
section 12 of the 2014 ELRC Act read with Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution provide a firm foundation for the exercise by the trial court of an array of discretionary powers to guarantee equal access to justice and the right to fair hearing.
p. 5Statutory basis for the ELRC's discretion to set aside dismissal orders
we come to the inescapable conclusion that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs to the respondent. Consequently, the ruling and orders of the ELRC (A. Nzei, J.) dated 8th December 2022 are hereby upheld. Orders accordingly.
p. 6Final orders - dismissal of the appeal and upholding of the decision below

Issues in the judgment

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minor

The judgment dates the dismissal order and the impugned ruling inconsistently: the ruling allowing the set-aside Motion is dated 8th December 2022, yet ground 1 of appeal refers to 'the Order made by her on 8th December 2022' in the context of setting aside what is elsewhere described as the 8th March 2022 dismissal order.

minor

The judgment refers to 'section 12 of the 2014 ELRC Act' although the statute is elsewhere described as the Employment and Labour Relations Act, 2011 and the ruling quotes section 12 of that Act.

minor

The introduction to the appellant's list of ten grounds of appeal is followed by paragraph 7 beginning 'In support of the appeal...' before the grounds continue with grounds 9 and 10, indicating a broken numbering sequence in the text of the judgment.

Key timeline

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Practical implications

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Frequently asked questions

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Cite this brief

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Cite this brief

Caselaw, "Middle East Bank Kenya Limited v Ngunjiri (Civil Appeal E019 of 2023) [2026] KECA 238 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2026). Not stated in the judgment. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/238/eng@2026-02-13

Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.