The Gardens & Wedding Centre Ltd v The Accounting Officer, County Government of Nakuru, Department of Health Services & 3 Others
The bottom line
#What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Questions the Court framed
#The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.
- 1.Whether the appellant, named as an interested party before the High Court, has locus standi to mount this appeal
- 2.Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the substantive judicial review application after the lapse of the mandatory 45-day period prescribed by Section 175(3) of the PPAD Act
- 3.Whether the delay occasioned by the court's own case management timetable is a valid exception to the statutory timelines
- 4.Whether constitutional provisions (Articles 47, 48, 259) override the strict statutory timelines under Section 175 of the PPAD Act
Key legal issues
#Locus standi of an interested party to appeal
A tenderer who was a party before the Review Board and an interested party before the High Court has locus standi to appeal; the respondents' authorities on joining interested parties were irrelevant.
The Court distinguished the Mumo Matemu line of cases, which concern applications by strangers to be enjoined. Here the appellant was an active litigant before the Board and the High Court. Section 170 of the PPAD Act recognises tenderers as parties to reviews, and the Court of Appeal Rules preserve appeal rights for parties to the original suit. The appellant only needed to show it was a 'person aggrieved' under Section 175.
Jurisdiction after lapse of the 45-day period under Section 175(3) PPAD Act
The High Court's jurisdiction under Section 175 is time-bound and automatically ceases on expiry of the 45 days; a decision rendered after that is a nullity.
Relying on Aprim Consultants, the Court held the 45-day window is an absolute boundary of judicial power, extinguished the moment the 45 days end. The timelines are 'cast in stone', immune to judicial variation, reflecting legislative intent to avoid stalling public procurement. The trial judge erred in holding the court retained power despite the lapse.
Court-caused delay as an exception to statutory timelines
Delay caused by the court's diary is no exception; in time-bound frameworks the litigant must proactively prosecute the case and alert the bench to the impending time bar.
The Court held the duty of a litigant in a rigid time-bound window shifts from passive participation to proactive prosecution. The respondents never sought an expedited hearing; no letter requesting expedition was on record. Under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act parties must assist the court in achieving expeditious resolution. Passive litigants cannot blame the court after the timeline lapses.
Constitutional arguments against statutory time bars
Articles 47, 48 and 259 do not immunise a litigant from strict statutory timelines; Section 175 was affirmed as a constitutional limitation satisfying Article 227.
While the Constitution is supreme, courts have consistently held that constitutional rights do not sweep away statutory deadlines. Statutory timelines serve a constitutional purpose (efficiency, rapid delivery of public infrastructure). The Constitution is not an 'emergency escape hatch' for parties who slept on their rights, and limiting procurement litigation windows is a justifiable limitation under Article 227.
Binding precedent on interpretation of Section 175
The trial court disregarded binding Court of Appeal decisions interpreting Section 175 and instead followed a High Court decision that disregarded those binding authorities.
Decisions of this Court on the time-bound jurisdiction under Section 175 existed before the trial court and addressed all issues urged. Citing Mwai Kibaki v Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, the Court censured the trial court for ignoring established appellate principles, characterising such deviation as a contumacious violation of stare decisis depriving litigants of established entitlements.
Legal principles established
#- The timelines in Section 175 of the PPAD Act are mandatory, non-extendable and jurisdictional; jurisdiction ceases automatically on effluxion of time.
- A tenderer who was a party before the Review Board and named as an interested party before the High Court has locus standi to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
- Constitutional rights cannot be invoked as a blanket excuse for failure to adhere to prescribed statutory timelines.
- In time-bound statutory frameworks, litigants bear a proactive duty to ensure their case is heard and determined before the statutory clock expires; registry or court-diary delays are no excuse.
- Lower courts cannot disregard binding decisions of superior courts; doing so is a contumacious violation of stare decisis.
Court orders
#- 1.The appellant's appeal allowed in its entirety
- 2.The ruling delivered by Sergon, J. on 13th August 2026 set aside in its entirety
- 3.Substituted with an order that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the 1st and 2nd respondents' judicial review application dated 28th May 2026 beyond the 45 days prescribed by the PPAD Act
- 4.The 1st and 2nd respondents to bear the costs of this appeal
The bench
#One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.
Wrote the judgment
Wrote the judgment
Wrote the judgment
- On appeal from
- High Court of Kenya at Nakuru
- HCJR Misc. Appl. No. E003 of 2026
- Jurisdiction invoked
- Section 175(4) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 (appeal from High Court decision on judicial review of Review Board decision)
Quotable passages
#Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.
We allowed the appellant’s appeal in its entirety, and set aside the ruling delivered by Sergon, J. on 13th August 2026 in its entirety
We substituted the said ruling with an order that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the 1st and 2nd respondents’ judicial review application dated 28th May 2026 beyond the 45 days prescribed by the Public Procurement & Asset Disposal Act (PPAD Act)
We also ordered the 1st and 2nd respondents to bear the costs of this appeal
This Court recognizes its authority and that of the High Court under this section as a "time-bound jurisdiction" that automatically ceases by the effluxion of time once the statutory clock run out
A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides
Issues in the judgment
#Paragraph 33 contradicts the disposition, describing the appeal as dismissed when it was allowed
1st and 2nd respondents described identically in the cause title, appearing as duplicative parties
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "The Gardens & Wedding Centre Ltd v The Accounting Officer, County Government of Nakuru, Department of Health Services & 3 Others", Case Analysis (2026). Civil Appeal No. NAK E146 of 2026. Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/2009/eng@2026-10-02
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.