Omondi v Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission & 4 others

Although the electronic devices and two title deeds were later returned to him the rest of the documents were retained. 3. The appellant asserted that the delay in concluding the investigations and failure to return the rest of the documents amounted to inordinate and unreasonable delay and a violation of his rights; that the 1st respondent’s action of raiding his house and oce, seizing properties and documents, keeping them for over half a decade pending those investigations, were acts of impunity and a violation of his right to equal protection of the law, dignity, privacy fair administrative action and privacy guaranteed under Articles 27, 28, 31, 40 and 47 of the Constitution. 4. The appellant averred that the continued holding of the documents had subjected him to untold suering; that the lifestyle assessment on him was not based on any known law and the continued and opaque investigations had negatively proled him and denied him many opportunities. The appellant contended that the respondents had violated his fundamental rights and freedoms from discrimination, freedom to dignity, privacy, right from deprivation of property, arbitrary search and entry, fair administrative action and sought declarations to that eect; damages; an order for immediate return of the documents; and an order lifting the restrictions placed against the properties; an order restricting the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents from further harassing him and an order directing the 1st, 2nd and 3rd to issue him with the necessary clearance(s). 5. The 1st 2nd and 3rd respondents led a replying adavit sworn by Evans Rono, admitting that the 1st respondent was carrying out investigations against the appellant, but maintained that search warrants were obtained for purposes of the investigations and following those investigations, the appellant was charged with Anti-corruption case No. 5 of 2019 and he was convicted on four counts; that after analyzing the documents, the appellant was issued with a notice under section 26 of the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act requiring him to explain the disproportionality between his known income and the assets he had acquired. However, the investigations were suspended due to the outbreak of Covid 19 and only continued after resumption of work; that the investigations extended to various places and required the investigators to visit various land registries and the properties to conrm their status. Some records were missing in the Land registry such as at Kisumu while Nyakach Land registry had been destroyed by re and the investigators were requested to give the ocers in those registries time to trace the documents. 6. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents maintained that the delay in the investigations was not intentional; investigators were sometimes changed due to transfers and the complex nature of the investigations which necessitated more time to conclude the investigations but the investigations did not interfere with the appellant’s possession or access to the properties. 7. The Attorney General, the 4th respondent, led grounds of opposition on its behalf and that of the Chief Land Registrar, the 5th respondent, asserting that the 4th respondent had no role to play in the investigations and that the appellant did not demonstrate how they (the 4th and 5th respondents) violated his rights. 8. The trial court heard the petition through written submissions and in its judgment dated and delivered on 26th June 2024, dismissed the petition holding that the appellant had not proved violation or infringement of his rights to dignity, privacy, property and fair administrative action. The trial court, however, directed the 1st respondent to conclude the investigations within eight months. 9. The appellant was dissatised and lodged this appeal on several grounds which can be summarized as follows, that the trial court erred in: misinterpreting the denition of administrative action under section 2 of the Administrative Action Act to exclude the actions and decisions of the 1st respondent https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 2

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and thereby excused the 1st respondent from its duty under Articles 10 and 40; failing to nd and hold that investigations for a period of six years had violated his rights to dignity, privacy and property; contradicting itself by, on one hand, holding that investigations should not be indenite and that prolonged investigations could infringe on fundamental rights, yet still accepted the 1st respondent’s explanation for the delay; violating Articles 10 and 163(7) of the Constitution on the rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis by departing from the precedent; misinterpreting Articles 40 and 260 on the meaning of property; by failing to nd that registering restrictions against his properties and detaining his documents for 6 years had violated his right to exclusive enjoyment of property; determining an issue (on forfeiture proceedings) that had not been pleaded and granting a relief that had not been sought; failing to nd that search warrants had not been obtained against his spouse yet investigators intruded her privacy; and failing to nd that the warrants were to be executed and returned to court forthwith. He sought an order allowing his appeal setting aside the judgment of the trial court and substituting it with an order allowing the petition with costs. 10. When this appeal was called out for plenary hearing through the court’s virtual platform, Mr. Ochiel, learned counsel appeared for the appellant while Ms. Kamau learned counsel was present for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents. There was no representation for the 4th and 5th respondents, though they had been duly served with a hearing notice by the Court. Both counsel relied on their written submissions dated 28th March 2025 and 24th February 2026, respectively with brief oral highlights, in disposing of the appeal. 11. Mr. Ochiel reiterated their position that the delayed investigations violated the appellant’s right to fair administrative action guaranteed under Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, contending that any power, function and duty exercised by authorities or quasi-judicial tribunal constitutes administrative action and cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and another v Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others [2022]KESC 59 (KLR) for the position that although the investigative powers of the 1st respondent are not administrative action within the meaning of Article 47 of the Constitution, some aspects of canons of fair administrative action such as eciency, lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness apply to some aspects of its mandate. 12. Counsel asserted that investigations ought to be carried out eciently and swiftly; that unreasonable delay amounts to a denial of the right to fair administrative action; that the 1st respondent took 23 title deeds for the appellant’s properties and kept them for over 6 years, but only returned one title deed retaining the rest and that by holding that there was no violation of the right to fair administrative action, the trial court violated Articles 10 and 163(7) on the rule of law and departure from stare decisis. Counsel cited the Supreme Court decision in Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 Others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR), for the submission that in Kenya, stare decisis is a constitutional principle; Evans Kidero & 4 others v Waititu & 4 others [2014] KESC 11(KLR) for the holding that departure from judicial precedents should be rare and justiable only on the basis of consideration of the deepest sentiments of justice occasioned by a complete dissociation of the factual situation between the previous case and that being considered; Zhang Jing v Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission (HC-CR-MISC E007 of 2023) for the proposition that a delay of 4 years was unreasonable and Jirongo v Soy Developers Limited & 9 others [2021]KESC 32(KLR) for the argument that prolonged delay in investigations deprived the appellant the legal tools to mount a credible defence. Counsel contended that failure to follow precedent would result in inconsistent decisions in similar matters, thereby violating the principle of equality before the law. 13. Mr. Ochiel faulted the trial court asserting that it misinterpreted Article 40 of the Constitution on the meaning of the right to property. According to counsel, taking away the title deeds deprived the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 3

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appellant the right to use or enjoy his property rights in those title deeds; that by virtue of Article 260, property includes any vested or contingent right to or interest in or arising from land, goods or personal property; that Article 40(3) forbids arbitrary deprivation of property of any description and that ownership means owning a bundle of rights beyond mere possession, and cited the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Mohd Noor v Mohd Ibrahim [1995] AIR 398 on the meaning of ownership. It was the view of counsel, that a title deed being the formal proof of land ownership, it is tied to ownership; thereby allowing the owner to enjoy the full benets of the property and that carting away the appellants title documents deprived him of the ability to fully exercise and enjoy his property rights. 14. Counsel went on to submit that the delayed investigations had prejudiced the appellant, and cited this court’s decision in Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission v County Government of Kitui [2025] KECA 311(KLR) for the proposition that sometimes delay can be so extensive that the length of delay itself is overt and sucient proof of inordinate delay, and Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission and another v Ojienda SC t/a Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others (supra) for the proposition that where the delay in investigations has the eect of denying the suspect the legal tools to mount a defence, the High Court is properly mandated by the Constitution to step in. 15. Mr. Ochiel again blamed the trial court for determining issues that had not been raised by any of the parties and cited the decision in Odd Jobs v Mubia [1970] EA 476 where the court held that a court may base its decision on un-pleaded issue if it appears from the course followed at the trial that the issue had been left to the court to decide. Counsel maintained that pleadings being the foundation of judicial proceedings and what denes the scope of the issues to be adjudicated by the court, the trial court erred in determining the issue of forfeiture proceedings and giving the 1st respondent 8 months to complete investigations, issues parties had not pleaded or submitted on. He urged the court to allow the appeal. 16. In opposing the appeal, Ms. Kamau, submitted that the investigations began in 2015 through inquiry les; that warrants to investigate and search were issued in 2017 and they were later extended to include the appellant’s spouse; that following the investigations, the appellant was charged in Anti-Corruption Case No. 5 of 2019; that the appellant was later served with notices for unexplained wealth which formed part of the proceedings in the forfeiture case; that in 2024, proceedings were commenced against the appellant and two of his companies; that investigations on unexplained wealth are complex and usually take long and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs R. S. Nayak & Anr AIR 1992 SUPREME COURT 1701, on the fundamental right to a speedy trial. 17. Counsel maintained that there was no violation of either the Constitution; the Fair Administrative Action Act or the appellant’s rights and called into aid the Supreme Court decision in Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission and another v Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others (supra). 18. With regard to the appellant’s complaint on the violation of the right to property, counsel submitted that the right can be limited; that the documents were seized pursuant to a court order and that the 1st respondent sought more time to conclude investigations. On the allegation that that the appellant lost opportunity to gain employment and earn a living, counsel submitted that the issue was raised in another case before the Employment and Labour Relations Court (ELRC) but that court held that there was no violation. Counsel maintained that keeping the documents pending completion of investigations did not bar the appellant from accessing and enjoying the right to those properties; asserted that the appellant did not establish violation or infringement of constitutional rights; maintained that the investigations were being conducted in good faith and in accordance with the law and that investigations by the 1st respondent do not fall within the denition of administrative https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 4

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action but they fall under enforcement of the law and cited the Supreme Court decision in Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission & Another v Tom –Ojienda & Associates & 2 others (supra) (paragraphs 51-61) for the submission that investigative powers when exercised cannot be described as administrative actions within the meaning of Article 47. 19. Ms. Kamau further submitted that the decision of the trial court did not violate Articles 10 and 163(7) on the rule of law and stare decisis; that the investigations were suspended due to the covid pandemic and only continued after operations resumed in mid-2021; that the investigations were spread to various parts of the country, including: Kwale; Kajiado, Eldoret; Kisumu; and Nairobi and in some cases like in Nyakach, the Land registry had been destroyed by re, while the Land registry in Kisumu informed the investigators that the documents were missing and requested for more time to trace the documents. 20. Counsel maintained that conducting investigations requires the balancing of competing interests to ensure fair and impartial investigations; that investigations in unexplained wealth are not clear cut or straight forward so that investigators cannot predict the route investigations will take or what challenges to expect and, therefore, it would be against public interest to limit the manner and depth in which the investigations are to be conducted. Counsel relied on this court’s decision in Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission v County Government of Kitui [2025] KECA 311(KLR) for the submission that a party must demonstrate both inordinate delay and specic prejudice suered, such as inability to access alternative records or bad faith in the investigations which the appellant did not demonstrate in this case; that the decision in Zhang Jing v Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission (supra) does not bind this Court; that the facts in Jirongo v Soy Developers Limited & 9 others(supra) are distinguishable from those in this appeal since in that case the documents had been lost unlike in the present appeal and that investigation must be considered on a case to case basis. 21. Counsel maintained that the trial court did not misinterpret Articles 40 and 260 of the Constitution; that search warrants were obtained for purposes of investigations, including seizure and carting away the documents; and that placing restrictions against the title deeds did not violate the appellant’s right to property since there was no interference with ownership and possession of those properties. 22. On whether the trial court determined issues that had not been pleaded, counsel responded in the negative, submitting that the 1st respondent asked for time to complete investigations and pointed out at paragraph 38 of Mr. Rono’s adavit and that the civil suit on the unexplained wealth namely ACEC E016 of 2024 was led on 11th June 2024 before the trial court delivered its judgment the subject of the present appeal. Regarding the claim that the appellant has not been able to secure employment, counsel maintained that the trial court was correct in observing that the 1st respondent was enforcing Chapter Six of the Constitution and that the issue of the 1st respondent providing information to prospective employers was raised and determined in ELRC Petition No. E084 of 2021-James Ambuso v Dr. Agnes Wahome & 3 others (Para 169) to the eect that the 1st respondent did not violate any law in cautioning the petitioner’s prospective employer. Counsel urged that the appeal be dismissed. 23. This being a rst appeal, it is by way of a retrial, and the principles upon which this Court acts are well settled. This Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and make due allowances in this respect. (See Gitobu Imyanyara & 2 Others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR). 24. We have considered the record, submissions made on behalf of the partis and the applicable law. The core issues that fall for determination are whether the delay in the investigations violated the petitioner’s rights and fundamental freedom and whether the trial court erred in granting reliefs that had not been sought. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 5

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25. On the rst issue whether the investigations violated the appellants rights, the appellant’s argument before the trial court was that the way the investigations were carried out, the carting away and retention of his documents and the period of over of over 6 years investigations violated his rights to dignity, privacy, fair administrative action and property. The trial court considered the arguments but did not nd merit in the claim on violations of any of the appellant’s rights. 26. We have considered the record of the trial court and reevaluated the evidence. On delayed investigations, the trial court pointed out that delay in investigations has to be determined depending on the circumstances of each case; that cognizable oences may take a shorter time while investigations in cases such as corruption, money laundering, among others, may take considerable time due to the complex nature of those investigations and that to determine whether there is inordinate delay in the investigations the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the impugned investigations. 27. In the appellant’s case, at the time of ling the petition before the trial court, the investigations had been going on for a considerable period of time. A review of the 1st respondent’s response in the replying adavit sworn by Mr. Rono, shows that the 1st respondent explained that the investigations began through inquiries; then investigators obtained search warrants to search and seize documents and that the investigations covered several counties and land registries. According to Mr. Rono, in some cases, like in the case of Nyakach, the land registry had been destroyed by re while in the Kisumu land registry, documents were missing. Land registry ocials in those registries requested for time to enable them trace the documents. Further, the investigations were suspended because of the Covid 19 pandemic and only resumed after people were allowed to go back to work. The appellant did not controvert these facts. 28. The court will not downplay a party’s claim that investigations had taken long, which amounted to a violation of his fundamental rights and freedoms. The court must investigate the complaint and satisfy itself on the veracity or otherwise of the claim. In the appellant’s case, the trial court appreciated the concerns raised by the appellant and observed as follows: Prolonged investigations may cause real drowsiness on a person’s life, take a toll on a person’s health, relations and livelihoods and create a feeling of gauntness and dreariness in the person under investigations. Worst of all, may, in appropriate cases, become an infringement of fundamental rights to dignity, privacy, property among others.” 29. The trial court noted that there has to be a balance between protecting constitutional rights and public interest in investigating and possibly recovering or forfeiture of illicit assets or proceeds of crime as a way of combating crime, including corruption and economic crime. We agree with the trial court that in the circumstances of this case, the 1st respondent suciently explained why the investigations had taken long. We note that the nature of the investigations the 1st respondent was conducting, the documents that were to be identied and analyzed and the arears the investigations were to cover as well as the intervening circumstances, such as the Covid 19 Pandemic, justied the period taken and could not be deemed to be an inordinate delay. 30. Tied to this issue was the appellant’s submission that the trial court erred in failing to nd that the delay violated his rights to fair administrative action, dignity, privacy and property. Article 47 (1) of the Constitution guarantees every person’s right to administrative action that is expeditious, ecient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This guarantees both substantive and procedural rights in administrative actions. The appellant’s complaint here was about investigations and not prosecution, so that the grievance was that the investigations had taken too long to conclude which amounted to a violation of his right to fair administrative action. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 6

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31. The appellant’s argument, as we understand it, was that the right to fair administrative action applies to his case in so far as the investigations were concerned, and that was why he faulted the trial court for holding that investigations by the 1st respondent do not fall within fair administrative action. The appellant cited the Supreme Court decision in Communication commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services & 5 others [2014] eKLR for the argument that Article 47 is a deliberate step towards the attainment of a fair and dependable government advancing fair, expeditious, ecient lawful, reasonable and procedural public policies. The respondents on their part maintained that the trial court was right in holding that Article 47 does not apply to investigations by the 1st respondent but agreed that investigations must be conducted in accordance with the law. 32. We have reviewed the record of the trial court. The trial court did not hold that the 1st respondent’s investigative actions do not fall within the meaning of fair administrative action. That notwithstanding, we are of the view, that this issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission and another v Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others (supra). One of the issues the Supreme Court was determining in that petition was whether investigations by the 1st appellant under Anti Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) constitute an administrative action subject to Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act. 33. After considering the denitions of the word “administrative action” the Supreme Court stated as follows: (57) 34. By stipulating that the legislation so contemplated has to among other things, promote ecient administration, the Constitution leaves no doubt that an “administrative action” is not just any action or omission, or any exercise of power or authority, but one that relates to the management of aairs of an institution, organization, or agency. This explains why such action is described as “administrative” as opposed to any other action.” On whether the 1st respondent’s investigative powers fall within the four corners of the denition of administrative action, the Supreme Court answered that question in the negative, stating: “ Part IV of the ACECA specically provides for the 1st appellant’s investigative powers….the powers granted therein include powers, privileges and immunities of a Police Ocer under Section 23(3), to search premises under Section 29, to apply for surrender of travel documents under Section 31, to arrest persons under Section 32 amongst others. Strictly speaking, these powers when exercised cannot be described as “administrative action” within the meaning of Article 47.”. For example, how can “conducting a house search” or “eecting an arrest” be considered as exercising administrative action? On the contrary, these are special powers conferred by a specic legal regime, to be exercised for a special purpose.” 35. Applying the above holding to the appeal before us, and in so far as the 1st respondent’s actions were investigative in nature having obtained search and seizure warrants for purposes of those investigations, its actions did not fall within the denition of administrative action in the strict sense of the word. In that regard, the appellant’s argument that the 1st respondent’s investigative actions violated his rights, cannot be correct. This view is reinforced by the position taken by the Supreme Court in the same case (Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission and another v Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others (supra) where it rendered itself in the following words: “ (61) Having already concluded that the investigative actions of the 1st appellant cannot be categorized as “administrative action” within the context of Article https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 7

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47 of the Constitution, we nd no basis upon which we can hold, that the 1st respondent’s rights were violated for failure to observe the requirements of the said Article. Therefore, in the absence of proof of violation of his other fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the impugned warrants ought not to have been quashed on the basis of this claim.” 36. On the authority of the above decision, we are satised that the trial court did not err when it held that the appellant’s right to fair administrative action guaranteed under Article 47(1) as read with the Fair Administrative Action Act was not violated. We must however point out that where Article 47(1) requires procedural fairness, expeditious and ecient actions mean, the investigation must be done expeditiously, eciently and fairly. However, as we stated earlier the respondent explained the delay and which means it wants to carry out ecient investigation because it was acting in public interest. 37. The appellant again argued that the trial court ignored stare decisis, and in particular the decision of Zhang Jing v Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission (supra) which found delay of investigations for 4 years to be inordinate. We reiterate, at the risk of repeating ourselves, that investigations in one case may not necessarily be similar to another case and therefore what amounts to delayed investigations will be determined on a case by case basis. In the circumstances of this appeal, we are unable to fault the nding by the trial court that the delay in the investigations did not violate the petitioner’s rights. 38. The appellant further complained that his rights to equal protection of the law under Article 27 was violated in that the 1st respondent issued an adverse report about him to would-be prospective employer and that his right to dignity, privacy and property were also violated. On dignity, the appellant contended in the petition that police ocers accompanying the investigators stormed his house, went to the bedroom when he was getting dressed up and his spouse was taking a shower; that they blocked everyone from going about their business, humiliated him in front of his family and caused commotion attracting many people’s attention which lowered his dignity. On freedom and security of the person, he asserted that the 1st respondent had taken control over his freedom. With regard to privacy, the appellant contended that the warrants were intended to serve the purpose of limiting his right to privacy which was not in accordance with the Constitution, and with regard to the right to property, he argued that the title documents were carted away, restrictions were placed against the properties, including those in the name of his spouse without disclosing the crime committed and that delayed justice is denied justice, a violation of Article 48 of the Constitution. The respondents denied violating any of the above rights maintaining that these rights can be limited. 39. We must emphasize here that a party claiming violation of his rights and fundamental freedoms must demonstrate that indeed there was violation, or there is continuing violation or that there is a threat to violate the rights and fundamental freedoms to put the opposite party on notice so that he/she can respond appropriately. This is because claims of violation of rights and fundamental freedoms are serious matters and any decision the Court may make on the issue is not a mere decorative nding. The Court has an obligation to redress any violation where it is proved and grant a constitutional remedy to vindicate the right that has been infringed or violated. 40. In this respect, the Supreme Court stated in Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services & 5 Others (supra) as follows: (349) …Although Article 22(1) of the Constitution gives every person the right to initiate proceedings claiming that a fundamental right or freedom has been denied, violated or infringed or threatened, a party invoking this Article has to show the rights said to be infringed, as well as the basis of his or her grievance. This principle emerges clearly from the High Court decision in https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 8

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Anarita Karimi Njeru v. Republic, (1979) KLR 154: the necessity of a link between the aggrieved party, the provisions of the Constitution alleged to have been contravened, and the manifestation of contravention or infringement. Such a principle plays a positive role, as a foundation of conviction and good faith, in engaging the constitutional process of dispute settlement.” 41. The appellant admitted that the investigators had search warrants on the basis of which they searched his house and the oce. His complaint was on the manner the warrants were executed alleging that his rights to dignity and privacy were violated in the process. The appellant did not argue that the investigators went to his house during odd hours, or that they harmed him during the search, or that the investigators took away what was not permitted by the search warrants. It is appreciated that searches are intrusive to one’s dignity and privacy and that is why courts issue search warrants to minimize unrestricted intrusion in one’s privacy. We also note that although the search was conducted on 11th October 2017, the complaint over violation of the rights was only raise in in this petition in 2024. Further, the appellant did not apply to the court that issued the warrants seeking to set them aside if at all. As it is, the search was conducted pursuant to lawful orders issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and they have not been recalled or set aside by that court. 42. The rights claimed to have been violated namely, those guaranteed under Articles 27, 38, 29 and 31 are not absolute rights. Put dierently, they are not non derogable rights under Article 25 of the Constitution. Moreover, the allegation that the warrants were intended to limit the appellant’s rights cannot be true since Article 24(1) of the Constitution allows limitation of rights where the limitation is by law and is reasonable and justiable in an open and democratic society. The limitation, if it so be called was based on a court order issued under the law and was for the purpose of fullling the 1st respondent’s constitutional and statutory mandate to enforce Chapter Six and therefore its actions could not be in violation of the Constitution. Those rights are subject to other rights and in the context of the petition before the trial court, public interest outweighed the appellant’s rights to equal protection of the law, dignity, freedom and privacy. 43. Regarding the claim for violation of the right to property, we can do no better than refer to Article 40(6) which provides that the rights under Article 40 do not extend to any property that has been found to have been unlawfully acquired. The investigations were intended to determine whether the properties were lawfully acquired and until it was determined that they were so acquired, we hold the view, that the appellant could not summon the aid of Article 40(3) of the Constitution because the properties had not been taken away from him until the investigations were concluded so that any action regarding those properties has to be in accordance with the Constitution and the law. 44. In that regard, where the 1st respondent is discharging its statutory mandate, and as long as it is acting in accordance with the Constitution and the statute, the constitutional permissiveness in respect to the rights under Articles 27, 28,29, 31, and 40 allows the respondent to discharge its mandate in respect to the investigations against the appellant. 45. The appellant again faulted the trial court for granting orders or reliefs that had not been sought by any of the parties. The appellant argued, in particular that the trial court fell into error when it directed the 1st respondent to conclude investigations within 8 months and that the trial court addressed the issue of forfeiture proceedings thereby interfering with his right to challenge such proceedings, if and when they were commenced against him. 46. Ordinarily, parties are bound by their pleadings and courts grant reliefs that are sought by the parties through their pleadings. This general principle does not, however, apply in respect to all cases but will depend on the nature of the case before that particular court. The case before the trial court was a https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 9

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constitutional petition challenging what the appellant perceived to be violation of his rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. This is clear from the relief the appellant sought in the petition including “any other or further relief this court may deem t and just to grant in the circumstances.” In his submissions before the trial court, the appellant urged the court to fashion an appropriate relief, which was an acknowledgement that the trial court had power to grant an appropriate relief depending on the nature of the case before it. 47. Article 23 (3) of the Constitution gives the court power to grant an appropriate relief which is intended to provide a remedy that eectively addresses a violation of rights, rather than merely adhering to rigid, pre- dened legal solutions. In other words, an appropriate relief is designed to be purposeful and tailored for specic circumstances of a case in order to ensure that justice is not only done but that the relief is eective in repairing the harm or preventing future or further breaches; enforces the Constitution and ensures that rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights are protected and enforced. (See Fose v Minister of safety and Security [1997] ZACC 6.) 48. The appellant having beseeched the trial court to grant an appropriate relief and the court having respondent upon appreciating that continued delay in the investigations had the potential to violate the appellant’s rights and directed the 1st respondent to conclude investigations in 8 months, it is disingenuous on the part of the appellant to argue that the trial court granted orders or reliefs that had not been sought. We do not nd merit in this argument. 49. Regarding the complaint that the trial court raised the issue of foreclosure proceedings and determined it, we were unable to nd such determination. The trial court merely responded to the appellant’s complaint that property belonging to his spouse had also been targeted by stating that under the law, a property which is reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime may be pursued even if it is in the hands of a third party or in forms other than the original illicit property. The appellant’s counsel attempted to argued before this Court that properties belonging to the appellant’s spouse had been targeted but admitted that the appellant’s spouse was neither a party before the trial court nor this court and therefore, the issue could not be properly raised and adjudicated in this appeal. 50. We are satised from the totality of the foregoing that the trial court properly concluded that the appellant’s rights had not been violated. We nd no merit in this appeal and direct each party to bear own costs. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. K. M’INOTI ……………………… JUDGE OF APPEAL E. C. MWITA ……………………… JUDGE OF APPEAL B. ONGAYA …………………… JUDGE OF APPEAL I certify that this is a true copy of original. Signed https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 10

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DEPUTY REGISTRAR. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1738/eng@2026-09-25 11

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