KM v Republic

appellate court unless they are shown to be based on no evidence or are perverse. Our mandate has been restated countless times by the Court in a plethora of decisions. For instance, in Mwangi vs. Republic [2026] KECA 640 (KLR), it was held that: “ A second appeal must be conned to points of law and this Court will not interfere with concurrent ndings of fact arrived at by the two courts below unless such ndings are based on no evidence or are based on a misapprehension of the evidence or the courts below are demonstrably shown to have acted on wrong principles in arriving at their ndings.” 5. In order to deliver on our mandate, it is necessary that we rehash the evidence adduced at the trial. The complainant, B.K., testied as PW1, and upon voir dire examination gave sworn testimony. She stated that on the material day at about 10.00pm her father sent her brother, MK. (PW5), to call her from their grandmother’s house, and when they reached their father’s house, he ordered PW5 to go back to their grandmother’s home. Her father then told her to get on the bed, removed her clothes and his clothes before inserting his ‘thing’ in her private parts. She stated that he did it twice. 6. PW2 was EM., the appellant’s sister-in-law, who testied that on 28th October 2014, the appellant’s father informed her that the appellant had called his (appellant’s) daughter at night and deled her. He requested her to follow up on the issue with the child at school. Together with FKK. (PW3), she went to the school where the minor informed them that the appellant had indeed forced himself on her. They reported the incident to the area assistant chief, who arrested the appellant and handed him over to the police. The child was then taken to hospital for examination and treatment. 7. PW3 conrmed that she accompanied PW2 to school on 28th October 2014, where the victim narrated to them how the appellant had raped her the previous night after summoning her to his house from her grandparents’ house. PW3 testied that the incident was then reported to the assistant chief before being escalated to the police. They recorded their statements with the police and escorted the minor to hospital, where she was treated. 8. CM (PW4), a teacher at the victim’s school, testied that on 28th October 2014, PW2, who introduced herself as the child’s aunt, went to the school enquiring if the minor had exhibited any changes in behaviour, and she replied that she had not noticed any change. They then went to the Deputy Head Teacher’s oce where PW2 reported that the appellant had deled the minor. They called the minor to the oce, who conrmed that her father had sent her brother to call her from her grandparents’ house before ordering her to sleep in his bed and deling her twice. 9. MK (PW5), the complainant’s brother, testied that on 27th October 2014 at about 10.00pm, his drunk father sent him to call his sister, B.K. from their grandfather’s house. After escorting his sister to the appellant’s house, the appellant instructed him to go to sleep at his grandfather’s place. The next morning, while on their way to school, his sister informed him that their father had raped her. 10. MM (PW6), the father to the appellant, testied that on 27th October 2014 at about 10.00pm he was at home when his son (the appellant) sent his grandson (PW5) to call his granddaughter (the victim). Being uncomfortable with this turn of events, he sent one M. to tell the appellant not to be calling children at night, and the appellant denied that the child was with him. The next day, he informed his sister-in-law about the incident. PW6, who disclosed his blindness to the trial court, also testied that in the course of the day he learned that the appellant had been arrested for deling his own child. He additionally stated that the appellant was drunk on the material night. 11. Dr. Katherine Kago (PW7) testied that B.K. was examined on 29th October 2014 at Mwingi District Hospital by Dr. Matheka, on whose behalf she was testifying. She stated that the vaginal area had a tear https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 2

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and the hymen was broken. Also observed was a whitish discharge from the vagina. PW7 stated that Dr. Matheka concluded that there were indications of vaginal penetration. 12. PC Kennedy Wekesa (PW8), the investigating ocer, testied that on 28th October 2014 at about 2.00pm while at Mwingi Police Station, he was instructed by the OCS to proceed to collect the appellant from Kiomo Assistant Chief’s Oce, where he had been detained. Upon arrival at the Assistant Chief’s oce, he was informed that the appellant had deled his daughter, BK, the previous night. The girl was also present. At the station, he recorded statements from the witnesses and issued the victim with a P3 form, which was lled at the hospital. PW8 produced the complainant’s clinic card, which indicated that she was born on 16th April 2002. 13. When found to have a case to answer, the appellant gave sworn testimony and called two witnesses. He denied committing the oence and stated that on the material date, he had been at work until 3.00pm, from where he left for town, where he stayed until 11.00pm when he went home and slept. The appellant testied that because he lived in a one-room house, BK. would always sleep in her grandfather’s house with another girl known as MM. The appellant testied that the next day the children went to school without any hint of mischief on his part. He proceeded to the Assistant Chief’s oce where he had a dispute with someone concerning unpaid dues. After concluding the case, he was instead tied up with a rope shortly before his daughter who was crying arrived escorted by PW3 and her teachers. It was then that his daughter was asked if he was the one, and she answered in the armative. The appellant maintained that he was framed due to dierences with PW3. 14. EM (DW2), the appellant’s mother, testied that she was away on 27th October 2014 and when she came back she was confronted by one N. who asked her to tell her who had deled BK. When she asked her husband (PW6) to tell him what had happened, he told her that, though he had gone to the appellant’s house, he was told by the appellant that their grandchild was not in the house and since he could not see, there was nothing he could do. DW2 protested that she was not involved in the matter. 15. The appellant’s wife, CM testied as DW3 (though indicated in the record as PW3) and stated that she was in Nairobi when the incident allegedly happened. She complained that she was not involved in the matter and painted a picture of a rosy marriage. She, however, conceded that none of those who took up the matter with the authorities had any grudge with her husband. 16. When the matter came up for hearing on 10th March 2026, the appellant appeared virtually from Kamiti Maximum Security Prison whereas Mr. Okemwa, learned Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, represented the respondent. The appellant indicated that he was relying on his submissions dated 30th January 2025 and ‘rebuttal submissions’ dated 26th March 2026. Mr. Okemwa, on his part, conrmed that he had led submissions dated 6th March 2024, which he would rely on. 17. In support of the appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecution did not establish the elements of incest conclusively and that the complainant’s testimony was not corroborated by the medical evidence, as the P3 form was marred by irregularities such as overwriting of dates and cancellation of entries. Still contending that the oence was not proved to the required standard, the appellant argued that he had consistently denied the charge and asserted that the complainant was inuenced by other family members. According to the appellant, he was targeted because of the grudge that existed between him and PW2 and PW3. According to the appellant, the testimony of PW5 as to the events of the material night contradicted that of the complainant. 18. Hammering home his claim that his conviction was not safe as it was premised on contradictory evidence, the appellant argued that there was contradiction in the testimony of the complainant and PW5 regarding where the complainant slept on the material night. The appellant contended that the https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 3

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complainant did not give a detailed account of how the oence occurred. According to the appellant, whereas the complainant testied that she reported the incident to PW2 and PW3 the morning after, these two witnesses gave conicting testimony as to the time of disclosure. 19. Insisting that his conviction should not stand, the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to provide sucient corroborative evidence to support the complainant’s allegations. While conceding that the P3 form conrmed a broken hymen, the appellant posited that this alone did not provide denitive evidence of sexual penetration. The appellant added that the evidence of the complainant’s relatives, without that of independent witnesses, was not suciently corroborative of the complainant’s testimony. Reliance was placed on Karanja vs. Republic [2022] KECA 1371 (KLR) for the proposition that a trial court must not only consider the testimony of the complainant but also critically assess whether it is corroborated by other evidence. 20. On a dierent point, the appellant faulted the trial magistrate for improperly shifting the burden of proof to him by insinuating in the judgment that the appellant’s failure to disprove the allegations was the basis for convicting him. This, the appellant contended, violated the principle of the presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental right in criminal law. 21. It was also the appellant’s submission that the learned Judge erred by dismissing his defence without providing clear points of determination. The appellant submitted that this was contrary to the requirements of section 169(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the learned Judge therefore failed in his duty by merely adopting the trial court ndings. Citing section 107 of the Evidence Act, Woolmington vs. DPP [1935] AC 462 and Miller vs. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 on the requirement for the prosecution to prove its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant asserted that the case against him was not proved to the required standard and he ought to have been acquitted. 22. In summary, the appellant, in seeking that his conviction be overturned, faulted the trial court for failing to assess the evidence or give weight to the possibility of animosity. With respect to the learned Judge, the appellant submitted that he erred in law by failing to adequately scrutinize the evidence and properly apply the legal principles required to establish the charge of incest. The appellant contended that his conviction was based on insucient and unreliable evidence, including a questionable medical document, inconsistent testimonies, coupled with failure to consider the potential bias of the prosecution witnesses. 23. On sentence, the appellant submitted that the life imprisonment meted out to him violated the principles of proportionality, fairness and individualization of sentencing. The appellant, relying on Dismas Kilwake vs. Republic [2019] eKLR, argued that the sentence was excessive. The appellant additionally submitted that the two courts below did not consider the mitigating circumstances. He beseeched the Court to award him a determinate sentence should his appeal against conviction fail. 24. Learned Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Okemwa, opposed the appeal, asserting that incest was proved beyond reasonable doubt because all the ingredients necessary to prove the charge were met. Counsel argued that there was proof of penetration from the testimony of the victim, which was supported by the medical evidence adduced by PW7 revealing that the labia minora was hyperemic and showed signs of injury, and there were healing bruises along the entry point of the vaginal canal caused by a blunt object. According to counsel, penetration was proved. 25. As for the age of the victim, Mr. Okemwa submitted that she was 12 years old as per the clinic card produced by PW4, which was supported by the complainant who stated that she was 12 years old. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 4

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26. Asserting that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was proved, Mr. Okemwa submitted that the girl testied that the appellant was her father and, in any event, the concurrent nding of fact on the relationship between the appellant and the victim by the two courts below cannot be disturbed on a second appeal. Counsel additionally submitted that the appellant and his wife (DW3) conrmed that BK is their child. 27. While agreeing with the appellant by citing Georey Muchugia Gitonga & Another vs. Republic [2020] KECA 746 [KLR] and Samuel Mwambuki & Another vs. Republic [2019] KECA 574 [KLR] that failure to comply with section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a minor error but a failure to provide a lawful judgment which can lead to the quashing of a conviction, Mr. Okemwa contended that the judgment of the trial court complied with the law. 28. Responding to the appellant’s claim that the rst appellate court failed to discharge its onus, Mr. Okemwa submitted that the learned Judge ably executed his mandate by re-evaluating the evidence afresh and arriving at independent ndings. Counsel further submitted that the appellant’s defence that he was framed by PW2 and PW3 due to existing dierences was considered and properly rejected. According to Mr. Okemwa, the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. 29. In his rebuttal submissions, the appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. He regurgitated his points on the reliability of the medical evidence as regards penetration and also argued that the age of the minor was not suciently proved. According to the appellant, the fact that the hymen was broken did not of itself prove the oence. The appellant reiterated that his defence was not properly considered and that the respondent’s submissions had failed to cure the fundamental defects in the prosecution case. 30. Having considered the record of appeal, the impugned judgment and the submissions of the parties, we identify the germane issue for our determination to be whether the prosecution proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 31. Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act denes incest as follows: “ Any male person who commits an indecent act or an act which causes penetration with a female person who is to his knowledge his daughter, granddaughter, sister, mother, niece, aunt or grandmother is guilty of an oence termed incest and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years: Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person.” 32. In MGK vs. Republic [2020] KECA 84 (KLR), the Court considered the ingredients of the oence of incest and concluded that: “ …. the ingredients that must be established for the oence of incest by a male person is, rst, that the victim and the oender are related within the categories stated under section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. Secondly, that the oender committed an act which caused penetration with the victim, and thirdly, the age of the victim must also be established for the proviso to apply.” 33. The appellant contended that the essential elements required to prove incest were not conclusively established at the trial, particularly the proof of penetration, as the P3 form was marred by irregularities, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 5

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thereby raising questions about it’s credibility and authenticity. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Judge shows that he considered this issue and held as follows: “ I have perused the P3 form relied upon. The cancellation I can see is where the form is printed hospital/dispensary. The word dispensary was canceled in ink. That cancellation in my view is understandable because the victim was taken to Mwingi District Hospital and not Mwingi Dispensary. It is a straight forward cancellation and in my view did not need to be endorsed by anybody. The other thing that can be noted from the said P3 form entries is the date when the child victim was taken to the hospital where the number 9 of date 29th October is overwritten. However in my view that is not a serious problem because it is clear from the entries in the whole document that the report to the police was made on 28th October 2014 and the girl taken to Mwingi hospital on 29th October 2014 which was the date the doctor made her entries in the P3 form on examining the girl. In my view therefore it cannot be said that the P3 form had defects which would render it incredible or inaccurate.” 34. The conclusion of the learned Judge cannot be faulted. The irregularities alleged by the appellant were explained away and in any case were so minor that they could not override the narrative that the complainant was seen at hospital by a doctor, who upon examining her, concluded that she had been sexually violated. 35. The appellant also argued that the fact that the medical evidence conrmed that the hymen was broken did not automatically imply penetration. The trial magistrate addressed the issue in the judgment as follows: “ PW7 the medical ocer who testied on behalf of Dr. Matheka stated upon examination, the complainant had a vaginal tear and her hymen was broken. There was evidence of vaginal penetration.” 36. On his part, the learned Judge, upon considering the evidence adduced at the trial concluded that: “ The complainant stated that the appellant asked her to sleep in his house and that they had sexual intercourse in his bed two times. The medical evidence from the P3 form which was signed on 29th October 2014 about twelve days later by PW7 Dr. Kathleen who produced it as an exhibit, showed that the hymen of the complainant was broken. This evidence is quite consistent.” 37. The two courts below cannot be faulted for reaching the unanimous decision that the appellant had sex with his daughter. The evidence of the victim, which the trial court found credible and which was analyzed afresh by the learned Judge, was consistent, cogent, and suciently corroborated by the medical evidence on record. In the circumstances, and guided by the principle enunciated in Chemagong vs. Republic [1984] KECA 64 (KLR) that an appellate court will not normally interfere with a nding of fact by the trial court unless it is based on no evidence, or on a misapprehension of the evidence, or the Judge is shown demonstrably to have acted on the wrong principles in reaching the ndings, we perceive no error on the part of the trial magistrate that would make us reach the contrary conclusion that penetration was not proved, more so, in circumstances where the rst appellate court, upon reanalyzing the evidence concurred with the trial magistrate. 38. With respect to the age of the minor, the appellant contended that the evidence adduced was insucient because the complainant was a minor whose evidence could not be relied upon, nor could https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 6

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the clinic card produced by PW4, who was not qualied to produce the exhibit. On this issue it is necessary to rst appreciate that in a charge of incest, the age of the victim is not an ingredient. Once sexual intercourse and the relationship parameters under section 22(1) & (2) of the Sexual Offences Act are met by the prosecution, a conviction should ensue. Nevertheless, since the appellant was condemned to serve the maximum sentence under the proviso to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that BK was a child at the time the oence was committed. 39. As to whether the age of the complainant was proved, the trial magistrate found that: “ On the issue of age of the complainant, the accused stated that she was aged 12 years. PW4 produced her clinic examination card as exhibit (5). It showed she was born on 16th April 2002. It corroborated the admission by the accused. Admitted facts need not be proved.” 40. In MW vs. Republic [2020] KECA 944 (KLR), this Court cited with approval the holding by the Ugandan Court of Appeal in Francis Omuroni vs Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2000 that: “ In a delement case, medical evidence is paramount in determining the age of the victim and the doctor is the only person who could professionally determine the age of the victim in the absence of any other evidence. Apart from medical evidence age may also be proved by birth certicate, the victim's parents or guardian and by observation and common sense...” 41. Similarly, in respect to proof of age of the victim, this Court in Mwalango Chichoro Mwanjembe vs. Republic [2016] KECA 183 (KLR) opined that: “The question of proof of age has nally been settled by recent decisions of this Court to the eect that it can be proved by documentary evidence such as a birth certicate, baptism card or by oral evidence of the child if the child is suciently intelligent or the evidence of the parents or guardian or medical evidence, among other credible forms of proof. It has even been held in a long line of decisions from the High Court that age can also be proved by observation and common sense. See Denis Kinywa vs. R, Cr. Appeal No.19 of 2014 and Omar Uche vs. R, Cr. App. No.11 of 2015. We doubt if the courts are possessed of the requisite expertise to assess age by merely observing the victim since in a criminal trial the threshold is beyond any reasonable doubt. This form of proof is a direct inuence by the decision of the Court of Appeal of Uganda in Francis Omuroni v Uganda, Crim. Appeal No. 2 of 2000. We think that what ought to be stressed is that whatever the nature of evidence presented in proof of the victim’s age, it has to be credible and reliable.” 42. Upon analysis of the evidence, we nd that the trial magistrate clearly addressed the issue of the age of the complainant and made a nding which we have no basis to disturb. We only need to add that we never understood the appellant’s argument that PW8 was not competent to tender the clinic card in evidence. We say so because we do not understand how it can be argued that the investigating ocer has no capacity to produce such an exhibit. As such, we agree with the trial magistrate that the victim was aged twelve years. 43. With respect to the appellant’s contention that his relationship with the complainant was not established, we only need to point to the testimony of the complainant herself, PW2, PW3, PW5,PW6, and even that of the appellant himself and his witnesses (DW2 and DW3), which conrmed beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the father of the complainant. We say no more on this point. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 7

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44. There was also the contention by the appellant that the witnesses gave inconsistent and conicting testimonies on the occurrence of the incident. In particular, the appellant argued that the accounts as to the time of disclosure of the act to PW2 and PW3 diered among themselves and from that of the complainant. The appellant further claimed that PW3 may have been biased as she was related to the complainant. 45. It is our considered view that the alleged minor discrepancies are not material. When confronted with an allegation of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, a court is called upon to consider the purported discrepancies vis-à-vis the totality of the evidence adduced. The court should nd that the discrepancies are material only if they are of such a nature as to create doubt as to the guilt of the accused. We have perused the record with a view to appreciating the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies, but we nd none. Nowhere did the complainant testify that she reported the incident to PW2 and PW3 before going to school. According to PW2 and PW3, the information about the incident emanated from PW6 who tasked them to proceed to the child’s school to investigate his suspicion concerning the previous night’s events. 46. With respect to the appellant’s submission that there was a contradiction between the testimony of the complainant and that of PW5, our perusal of the record discloses no such discrepancies. Even if there were any contradictions, we would nd that they were not of a magnitude that would aect the culpability of the appellant, as they do not go to the core of the prosecution case. The unshaken foundation of the prosecution case is that the appellant summoned his twelve-year-old daughter to his house at night and commanded her to climb his bed, where he deled her. The medical evidence conrmed penetration, and so did the circumstantial evidence of PW5 and PW6, who witnessed the summoning of the child by the appellant. On the principles that guide courts where it is claimed that the evidence of the witnesses is contradictory and inconsistent, we only need to cite the decision of this Court in Watu vs. Republic [2016] KECA 696 (KLR) where it was held that: “ The rst question in this appeal is whether the prosecution case was riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies of the magnitude that would make the conviction of the appellant unsafe. It cannot be gainsaid that to found a conviction in a criminal case, where the trial court has to be satised of the accused person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution evidence must be cogent, credible and trustworthy. Evidence that is obviously self- contradictory in material particulars or which is a mere amalgam of inconsistent versions of the same event, diering fundamentally from one purported eyewitness to another, cannot give the assurance that a court needs to be satised beyond reasonable doubt. However, it must be remembered that when it comes to human recollection, no two witnesses recall exactly the same thing to the minutest detail. Some discrepancies must be expected because human recollection is not infallible and no two people perceive the same phenomena exactly the same way. Indeed, as has been recognized in many decisions of this Court, some inconsistency in evidence may signify veracity and honesty, just as unusual uniformity may signal fabrication and coaching of witnesses. Ultimately, whether discrepancies in evidence render it believable or otherwise must turn on the circumstances of each case and the nature and extent of the discrepancies and inconsistencies in question.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 8

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47. Turning to the appellant’s argument that his defence was not considered, we nd the argument not supported by the record. Indeed, the trial magistrate addressed the appellant’s defence stating that: “ The accused claimed he was framed by PW3 and PW2 since they had a grudge and did not get along well. He also claimed the complainant’s teachers were inuenced [by] PW2 and PW3 to frame him. He did not demonstrate what grudge PW4, a teacher had to frame him. In addition the accused person’s mother admitted she was not at home on the material day. The complainant’s mother was at Nairobi. They claimed they were not involved in the case hence the accused was being framed. However, by their own admission, they were absent on the material day. Their evidence would have been of little value to the prosecution case.” 48. When the appellant raised the issue that his defence was not considered in his rst appeal, the learned Judge found that: “ The third technical point is the complaint that the magistrate failed to consider the appellant’s defence testimony. In view of my nding on the issue of grudge above I nd that it is not true that the magistrate did not consider the defence of the appellant in her judgment. In addition to what the learned magistrate said above, she went on to state as follows in the Judgment:…. The above observations in my view shows that the learned magistrate was alive to the defence of the appellant and the evidence of the appellant’s witnesses. The appellant’s mother was a defence witness. The complainant’s mother was also a defence witness. It cannot thus be said that the trial court did not consider the defence testimony of the appellant and his witnesses.” 49. On our part, we have perused the record, and it emerges that the appellant’s claim of a grudge held against him by PW2 and PW3 nds no support. In fact, the complainant’s wife was categorical when cross-examined by the prosecutor that none of the witnesses had a grudge against her husband. Additionally, apart from the testimony of the two witnesses (PW2 and PW3) which, in our view, was peripheral, there was the testimony of the complainant, the appellant’s son and the appellant’s father which clearly linked the appellant to the oence. The appellant’s defence was thus correctly rejected. 50. On the appeal against sentence, we observe that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellant is provided in the proviso to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. The appellant contested the severity of the sentence, which is categorized under section 361(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as a matter of fact. This Court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal against sentence is only exercisable where the High Court enhanced the sentence or where the trial court had no power to pass the sentence. It follows that we cannot address the severity of sentence in the circumstances. 51. Furthermore, the appellant never raised the issue of severity of the sentence at the High Court, and the issue was indeed not considered by the learned Judge. And, as per the holding of the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 Others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR), this Court, on a second appeal, is bereft of jurisdiction in respect of issues not addressed by the High Court. As such, the appeal against sentence, just like the appeal against conviction, must fail. 52. The end result is that the appellant’s appeal fails in its entirety and is dismissed. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 9

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DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026. W. KORIR ..................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL L. M. NDOLO ..................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL A. I. HASSA ..................................... JUDGE OF APPEAL I certify that this is a true copy of the original. Signed DEPUTY REGISTRAR. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1839/eng@2026-09-25 10

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