Mugambi & another (Suing as the legal representatives of the Estate of the Late Raphael Mugambi - Deceased) & 3 others v Opiyo & 19 others (Environment and Land Case E018 of 2022) [2026] KEELC 3387 (KLR)

CREDIT BANK LIMITED ........................................................... 11TH DEFENDANT FORMER COUNTY COUNCIL OF MERU THRO, THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF MERU ......................................................... 12TH DEFENDANT LAND REGISTRAR, MERU COUNTY ..................................... 13TH DEFENDANT THE HON ATTORNEY GENERAL ........................................... 14TH DEFENDANT JASON MWENDA MATHIU ....................................................... 15TH DEFENDANT EYE FRIENDS CARE LIMITED .................................................. 16TH DEFENDANT RAMESH CHANDRA SAMAT ................................................... 17TH DEFENDANT ANKIT RAMESH CHANDRA .................................................... 18TH DEFENDANT I & M BANK LIMITED ................................................................ 19TH DEFENDANT ELIZABETH KALIUNTU ANGAINE ......................................... 20TH DEFENDANT RULING 1. Falling for determination in this ruling is the notice of motion dated 20/1/2026. The application was brought by the 1st and 4th plaintifis. Through it, the applicants sought: (i) an order of inhibition barring registration of dealings in the land register relating to parcel numbers Meru Municipality Block 1/257 and Meru Municipality Block 1/258, pending the hearing and disposal of this suit; and (ii) an order granting the plaintifis leave to amend their plaint in terms of the exhibited draft amended plaint. 2. The plea for leave to amend the plaint was disposed vide a brief ex-tempore ruling dated 18/2/2026. Consequently, what remains to be disposed in this ruling is the plea for an inhibition order. The key issue to be determined in the ruling is whether the application meets the criteria for granting an interlocutory injunction in form of an inhibition order. Before I analyse and dispose the issue, I will briefiy outline the parties’ respective cases in the context of the plea for an inhibition order. 3. The application was premised on the grounds outlined in the motion and in the supporting afidavit sworn on 20/1/2026 by Lucy Karimi Mugambi. It was canvassed through oral submissions tendered by Mr Kiruai. The case of the applicants is that the two parcels are at the risk of being alienated. The applicants point out that parcel number Meru Municipality Block 1/258 has changed hands from the 1st defendant to the 17th and 18th defendants and has been charged to the 19th defendant. 4. The 1st – 9th defendants and the 15th – 18th defendants were represented by Ms Mutema Advocate. They opposed the application through the following three replying afidavits: (i) afidavit dated 17/2/2026, sworn by the 16th defendant; (ii) afidavit dated 17/2/2026, sworn by the 4th defendant and afidavit dated 28/4/2026 sworn by the 18th defendant. Their case is that they purchased their respective parcels for value. At the time of purchase, they conducted due diligence and the parcels were unencumbered. They fault the applicants for bringing the present application belatedly and contend that they will be gravely prejudiced if the inhibition orders were to be granted. 5. The 10th defendant opposed the application through a replying afidavit sworn on 13/2/2026 by Martin Kimaita, a loan recovery oficer; and oral submissions tendered by Mr Kariuki. Their case is that they are chargees and their charge was registered long before this suit was filed. They emphasize https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3387/eng@2026-06-02 2

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that their charge takes predence over any unregistered claim over the suit lands. It is their case that an inhibition order will efiectively take away their charge. 6. The 20th defendant opposed the application through her replying afidavit dated 7/5/2026. Her case is that she lawfully acquired Plot No 114 in the 1990s and she was subsequently registered as proprietor of the land. She was all along in occupation of the land. None of the plaintifis objected to her acquisition of the land. None of them challenged her titles for 28 years. None objected to her disposal of the subsequent subdivisions. She faulted the plaintifi for initiating this suit 28 years after she acquired the land. She urged the court to reject the application. 7. The court has considered the application, the response to the application, and the oral submissions tendered on the plea for an order of inhibition. An order of inhibition is, by and large, an interlocutory injunctive order barring the registration of any dealings in the land register relating to a parcel that is the subject of litigation, pending the hearing and disposal of the case. Consequently, the single question to be answered in this ruling is whether the application meets the criteria for granting an ordinary interlocutory injunction in the nature of an order of inhibition. 8. The relevant criteria on a trial court’s jurisdiction to grant an ordinary interlocutory injunctions was outlined by the Court of Appeal for East Africa in the case of Giella v Cassman Brown (1973) EA 358. First, the applicant is required to demonstrate a prima facie case with a probability of success. Second, the applicant is required to demonstrate that if the plea for an interlocutory injunction is declined, he will stand to sufier injury that may not be adequately indemnifiable through an award of damages. Thirdly, should the court have doubt on either or both of the above, the application is to be determined on the basis of the balance of convenience. 9. Over the years, our superior courts have developed a fourth principle to the efiect that, at the stage of disposing the plea for interlocutory injunction, the court should refrain from making conclusive or definitive pronouncements on the key issues in the dispute. The courts have emphasized that definitive and conclusive pronouncements/findings should be reserved for the final disposal of the dispute. 10. The Court of Appeal defined a prima facie case in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others as follows: “ A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a “genuine and arguable case.” It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.” 11. Have the applicants demonstrated a prima facie case with the probability of success? From the interlocutory evidence presented to the court by the applicants, the two parcels that are the subject matters of the application under consideration are subdivisions out of what previously existed as Plot No. T142 Meru Municipality. Plot No T142 was subdivided into Plot Nos R14, R15, R16, R17, R18, R19 and R20. The said plots were allocated to the 20th defendant in the 1990s and the 20th defendant was issued with registered lease titles in the year 2000. Vide letters dated 11/11/1999, the Commissioner of Lands notified Raphael Mugambi and Francis Maingi that the plots were not available for allocation to them because they fell within T142 which had already been alienated. 12. From the 1990s to 2022, Raphael Mugambi and Francis Maingi did nothing in terms of challenging the 20th defendant’s allocation and titles. The title for parcel number 258 was registered on 13/6/2000 in the name of the 20th defendant. On 15/4/2002, it was transferred to Jeremiah Mungania. On 13/6/2006, Jeremiah transferred it to Jane Njeri. On 4/12/2013 Jane transferred it to Andrew Odero Opiyo. On 6/3/2024 Andrew transferred the land to the 17th and 18th defendants. The title has been https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3387/eng@2026-06-02 3

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charged to financial institutions four times. Currently, there subsists a charge in favour of I & M Bank Ltd. 13. Although title number 257 is still in the name of the 20th defendant, it is charged to the 10th defendant. 14. Given the fact that the applicants did not initiate land recovery proceedings to challenge the two titles for over 22 years despite being aware that the titles existed, the court doubts that at this point in time they can successfully mount a claim for recovery of the parcels. Without being definitive or conclusive, the court doubts that the applicants’ respective claims meet the 12 year limitation threshold under the Limitation of Actions Act. 15. On irreparable damage, the evidence before court is that the applicants have never had possession of the two parcels. Secondly, the current holders of most of the parcels in this suit are purchasers for value who did not know about any double allocation that may have happened in the 1990s. The innocent purchasers and the innocent chargees are the ones to sufier grave prejudice if an inhibition order was to be issued against the two titles. 16. Given the history of the two parcels, the balance of convenience tilts against the applicants who for over 22 years did nothing in terms of challenging the 20th defendant’s allotments and titles which they were aware existed. 17. For the above reasons, the finding of the court is that the application under consideration does not satisfy the criteria for granting an interlocutory injunctive order in the nature of an inhibition. Consequently, the application is rejected and dismissed for lack of merit. 18. In tandem with the principle in Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, the applicants shall bear costs of the application. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS 2ND DAY OF JUNE, 2026. B M EBOSO [MR] ELC JUDGE https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3387/eng@2026-06-02 4

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