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Original judgment

Margaret Timanoi Kumari (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Lemontoi Parkire (Deceased)) v Moses Konana Parisionka & 7 Others

REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT KAJIADO ELC CASE NO. E038 OF 2026 MARGARET TIMANOI KUMARI (SUING AS THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF LEMONTOI PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT PARKIRE (DECEASED).................... VERSUS MOSES KONANA PARISIONKA DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT PIUS NYABUGA MOCHAGE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT PETER AMIN KANYUAYA DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT THE CHIEF LAND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT ................. 1ST ................... 2ND NTUSSUR REGISTRAR ....... 3RD ................. 4TH THE LAND REGISTRAR, DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT NGONG ............ 5TH THE LAND REGISTRAR, DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT KISAMIS ............ 6TH .................... 7TH ..................... 8TH THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT SURVEY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT AND DIRECTORATE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS…...... INTERESTED PARTY RULING __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 1

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(In respect of the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion Application dated 2nd March 2026 seeking orders of temporary injunction) Introduction 1. This Ruling determines the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion Application dated 2nd March 2026 and filed on the same date under Certificate of Urgency. The Application is brought by Margaret Timanoi Kumari, suing as the legal representative of the estate of the late Lemontoi Parkire, also referred to in the historical title records as Lemontoi Ole Parkere, pursuant to Limited Letters of Administration ad litem issued on 22nd December 2025 in Narok Chief Magistrate’s Court Misc. Succession Cause No. E146 of 2025. 2. The Application is expressed to be brought under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21, Order 40 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Article 159(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. It is supported by the Applicant’s Supporting Affidavit sworn on 28th January 2026 and the Further Affidavit filed in support thereof. 3. In the said application, the following substantive orders were sought: a) SPENT __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 2

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b) SPENT c) Pending the hearing and determination of the suit an injunction do hereby issue restraining the Respondents whether by themselves and or agents and or employees and or through anyone acting on their behalf and/or authority from selling, transferring, taking possession, excising any portion therefrom, evicting or in any way dealing with the Suit Properties being Kajiado/EwuasoKendong/4591, Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4592 and Kajiado/Ewuaso - Kendong/4593 located in Kajiado County. d) The Plaintiffs be at liberty to apply for such further orders and/or directions as this Honourable Court may deem just and fit to grant. e) The costs of this application be borne by the Defendants. 4. The dispute concerns Kajiado/Ewuaso- three parcels of land, namely Kendong/4591, Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4592 and Kajiado/EwuasoKendong/4593 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the suit properties”), situated in Kajiado County. The Applicant’s case is that the three parcels were created from the parent parcel known __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 3

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as Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/7, measuring approximately 261 hectares, which was originally registered in the name of the deceased, Lemontoi Parkire. 5. The Applicant contends that the deceased died on 1st August 2005 and that, between 2016 and 2019, long after his death and before the commencement of succession proceedings, the parent parcel was unlawfully and fraudulently subdivided and dealings undertaken thereon without the knowledge, consent or participation of the deceased’s estate or beneficiaries. 6. In particular, the Applicant avers that Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4592, measuring approximately 76.89 hectares, was excised and transferred to the 1st Defendant in 2016, thereafter to the 2nd Defendant in 2019 and subsequently to the 3rd Defendant in the same year. She further avers that Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4593, measuring approximately 20.23 hectares, was transferred to the 3rd Defendant, while Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4591, measuring approximately 163.87 hectares, remains registered in the name of the deceased. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 4

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7. The Application is opposed by the 1st Defendant, Moses Konana Parisionka, and the 3rd Defendant, Peter Amin Kanyuaya Ntussur, through Replying Affidavits, including the Replying Affidavit sworn by the 1st Defendant on 4th May 2026 on his own behalf and on behalf of the 3rd Defendant, together with the Replying Affidavit dated 30th April 2026. 8. The Respondents’ position is that the late Lemontoi Parkire sold approximately 250 acres of the parent property to United Insurance Company Limited in 1993 for Kshs. 2,300,000/=; that the property is under the statutory management of the Policyholders Compensation Fund (PCF); and that the register entries purporting to show the 1st and 3rd Defendants as proprietors are forged. The Respondents further contend that the present proceedings are politically motivated and intended to prejudice the 1st Defendant’s political aspirations in the 2027 General Elections. 9. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations is joined in the proceedings as the Interested Party following complaints made concerning the disputed transactions and the allegations of fraud and forgery surrounding the suit properties. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 5

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10. The Application was canvassed by way of written submissions, which have been duly filed, considered and taken into account by the Court in determining the issues arising herein. Analysis and Determination 11. I have considered the Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026, the affidavits filed in support and opposition thereto, the written submissions and the authorities cited by the parties. In my view, the substantive issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff/Applicant has satisfied the principles for the grant of a temporary injunction pending the hearing and determination of the suit. 12. The jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction is founded principally upon Order 40 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The Court’s discretion, however, is not exercised on the basis of the merits of the entire suit at the interlocutory stage. The Court is required to determine whether the Applicant has demonstrated the established threshold for preservation of the subject matter pending trial. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 6

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13. The applicable principles remain those set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, where the Court stated: “First an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability interlocutory injunction granted unless suffer irreparable adequately of be the success. Secondly, an will normally be not applicant might injury which compensated by otherwise would an award not of damages. Thirdly, if the Court is in doubt, it will decide an application on the balance of convenience.” 14. The Court of Appeal subsequently clarified the sequential nature of those requirements in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, stating that: “In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to; (a) establish his case only at a prima facie level, (b) demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted, and (c) ally any doubts as to (b) by showing that the balance of __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 7

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convenience is in his favour. These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially.” 15. The first question is therefore whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (supra) adopted the definition in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125, as follows: “In civil cases, a prima facie case is a case in which on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. A prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues but the evidence must show an __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 8

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infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the applicant’s case upon trial.” 16. The Applicant's claim is founded principally upon the assertion that the deceased was the registered proprietor of the parent parcel Kajiado/EwuasoKendong/7, that he died on 1st August 2005, and that the subsequent subdivision and dealings with the parent parcel occurred years after his death. The Applicant further contends that the Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4592 resulting and parcels, 4593, were particularly transferred through transactions which neither the deceased nor his estate could have lawfully undertaken. 17. At this stage, the Court is not called upon to make a final finding on whether the alleged sale in 1993 occurred, whether the subsequent transfers were fraudulent, whether the register entries were forged, or whether the Policyholders Compensation Fund has any enforceable interest in the property. Those are matters requiring interrogation of documentary and oral evidence at the trial. 18. What is material at this interlocutory stage is that the Applicant has placed before the Court a coherent challenge to the __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 9

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subsequent dealings with the land, founded upon the alleged death of the registered proprietor before the impugned transactions and the alleged subdivision and transfers thereafter. These allegations are sufficiently serious and supported by the circumstances disclosed to call for an explanation by the persons responsible for the impugned transactions. 19. The statutory position is also relevant. Section 24(a) of the Land Registration Act, 2012 provides: “The registration of a person as the proprietor of land shall vest in that person the absolute ownership of that land together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant thereto.” 20. Section 26(1) of the same Act further provides: “The certificate of title issued by the Registrar upon registration, or to a purchaser of land upon a transfer or transmission by the proprietor shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor of the land is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject to the encumbrances, easements, restrictions and __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 10

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conditions contained or endorsed in the certificate, and the title of that proprietor shall not be subject to challenge, except—(a) on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party; or (b) where the certificate of title has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme.” 21. The Court therefore accepts that registration ordinarily confers proprietary rights. Equally, however, the statute expressly permits such title to be challenged on the grounds set out in Section 26. The Applicant's allegations fall squarely within matters contemplated by that provision. Indeed, recent authorities continues to recognize that a registered title may be impeached where the statutory grounds are established. 22. I am consequently satisfied, without prejudging the final merits of the suit, that the Applicant has demonstrated a prima facie case with a probability of success. The first limb of Giella is therefore satisfied. The second question is whether, absent an injunction, the Applicant is likely to suffer injury which cannot adequately be compensated by damages. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 11

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23. The dispute concerns substantial parcels of land allegedly forming part of the estate of a deceased registered proprietor. The Applicant apprehends further sale, transfer, subdivision, possession and other dealings with the suit properties. If such dealings occur while the legality of the existing titles and transactions remains unresolved, the substratum of the suit may be altered and further third-party interests created. 24. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (supra) explained the nature of irreparable injury thus: “The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot ‘adequately’ be compensated by an award of damages.” 25. In the circumstances of this case, the potential injury is not merely monetary. Further subdivision or transfer may complicate the determination and enforcement of whatever final orders the Court may ultimately make. The risk is particularly material where the very validity of the underlying transactions and titles is the subject of the suit. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 12

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26. I therefore find that the Applicant has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of irreparable injury to warrant preservation of the suit properties pending trial. 27. Having found that the Applicant has established both a prima facie case and the likelihood of irreparable injury, it is unnecessary to proceed to the third limb. Nevertheless, even if the Court were in doubt, the balance of convenience plainly favours preservation of the status quo. 28. The order sought does not finally determine ownership. It merely restrains further dealings with the suit properties until the dispute is adjudicated. On the other hand, allowing further transfers, subdivisions or dealings during the pendency of the suit would potentially complicate the proceedings and expose the estate to further prejudice. 29. The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (supra) emphasized that the purpose of interlocutory injunctive relief is to preserve the subject matter pending determination of the parties' rights. 30. I therefore find that the balance of convenience also favours preservation of the suit properties. __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 13

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31. The Court remains conscious that an interlocutory application is not the occasion for finally determining contested questions of ownership, fraud, forgery or the alleged 1993 sale. Those matters shall be determined upon presentation and testing of the evidence at the hearing of the suit. 32. The Applicant has nevertheless satisfied the three applicable requirements for the grant of a temporary injunction. The suit properties ought therefore to be preserved in their present state so that the Court's eventual determination is not rendered a mere academic exercise. 33. In the result, and for the reasons set out above, the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026 is determined in the following terms: a. An order of temporary injunction shall issue restraining the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Defendants/Respondents, whether by themselves, their agents, employees or through any person acting on their behalf and/or authority, from selling, transferring, taking possession, excising any portion therefrom, evicting or in any __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 14

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way dealing with the suit properties, namely land registration numbers Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4591, Kajiado/EwuasoKendong/4592 and Kajiado/Ewuaso-Kendong/4593, pending the hearing and determination of the suit. b. The Court directs that the costs of the Notice of Motion dated 2nd March 2026 shall abide the outcome of the substantive suit. It is so ordered. Dated Signed and Delivered Virtually this 24th Day of September 2026. M.D. MWANGI JUDGE In the virtual presence of: Mr. Muoki for the Plaintiff/Applicant Mr. Najojo h/b for Mr. Wanyama for the 1 st Respondent N/A by the 2nd to 8th Defendants Court Assistant: Alex M.D. MWANGI __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 15

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JUDGE __________________________________________________________________ RULING ELCC E038/26 16

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