BKR (Suing as Father and Next Friend to the Minors DCR & LKR) v FNM (Children's Case E119 of 2023) [2026] KEMC 255 (KLR)

The Plaintifi ’s Case 6. The Plaintifi, BKR, testified that he is the biological father of the minors and has, over the years, taken primary responsibility for their upbringing. He stated that he has been providing for their essential needs including education, shelter, food, and general welfare. 7. He testified that the minors have been residing in Molo within Nakuru County, where they have been attending school and have grown up in a stable and familiar environment. He further stated that the home setting includes support from extended family members, particularly the paternal grandparents. 8. The Plaintifi indicated that during the subsistence of the relationship, the Defendant, due to her employment in Kitui County, would often leave the minors under his care and only return periodically during weekends, holidays or leave periods. 9. According to the Plaintifi, on or about April 2023, the Defendant took the minors away from their home without informing him. He stated that he was unable to trace their whereabouts for several days, which compelled him to seek the Court’s intervention. 10. He testified that following court intervention, the minors were eventually returned to him and resumed their schooling in their previous schools in Molo. Since that time, they have remained in his custody. 11. The Plaintifi further stated that since regaining custody of the minors, he has single-handedly taken care of their needs without any financial or material support from the Defendant. 12. He also told the Court that although the Defendant was granted access rights by way of interim orders, she has not taken advantage of such access by physically visiting the minors, instead maintaining communication with them through telephone and electronic means. 13. It was the Plaintifi’s evidence that the present arrangement ofiers the minors stability, continuity in education, and a conducive environment for their growth. He therefore urged the Court to grant him legal, actual and physical custody, with the Defendant being granted structured access. The Defendant’s Case 14. The Defendant, FNM, testified that she is the biological mother of the minors and has been actively involved in their upbringing. She stated that although she works in Kitui County, she maintained regular contact with the minors by visiting during weekends, holidays and leave periods. 15. She testified that the relationship between herself and the Plaintifi deteriorated due to irreconcilable difierences, which led her to leave the matrimonial home in April 2023. 16. The Defendant denied any suggestion that she abandoned the minors. She explained that she had initially relocated with them but later handed them over to the Plaintifi after he obtained ex parte court orders, which she complied with. 17. She informed the Court that she is willing and able to assume full parental responsibility and is adequately placed to provide a suitable home environment for the minors. 18. The Defendant also alleged that her departure from the matrimonial home was occasioned, in part, by the Plaintifi’s aggressive conduct. 19. She relied on the testimony of DCR, who stated that the Defendant previously lived with them and played an active role in their upbringing, including assisting them with their schoolwork. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 2

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20. According to the minor’s evidence, since the Defendant left, the minors have often been left in the care of their grandparents or other relatives, and that they lack the direct guidance and support that the Defendant used to provide, particularly in their education. 21. The Defendant further contended that the Plaintifi is not able to provide consistent personal care to the minors, as he frequently delegates their care to extended family members. 22. She also stated that she has been denied meaningful access to the minors despite her willingness to be involved in their lives. 23. The Defendant maintained that it would be in the best interests of the minors for them to be placed under her custody, where they would receive direct parental care, supervision, and emotional support. She therefore urged the Court to grant her legal, actual and physical custody of the minors, with the Plaintifi being accorded access and contributing to their upkeep. The Plaintifi ’s Submissions 24. Counsel for the Plaintifi, BKR, submitted that the Court ought to grant him legal, actual and physical custody of the minors, on the basis that he has demonstrated the capacity, consistency, and commitment required to serve the best interests of the children. Counsel anchored his submissions on Article 53 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which provides as follows: Article 53(1)(e) “ Every child has the right—…(e) to parental care and protection, which includes equal responsibility of the mother and father to provide for the child, whether they are married to each other or not.” Further reliance was placed on: Article 53(2) “ A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” Counsel also cited Section 8(1) of the Children Act, 2022, which provides: “ In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies— (a) the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration; and (b) the best interests of the child shall include, but shall not be limited to the considerations set out in the First Schedule.” 25. It was submitted that these provisions impose a duty upon the Court to prioritize the welfare of the minors above all else. 26. Counsel further relied on the Supreme Court decision in Mutheu Agatha Khimilu v Raheem Mehdi Aziz Azad & 4 Others, Petition No. 2 (E003) of 2022, where the Court stated: “ Courts, therefore, while making a decision that will impact the child are mandated to consider all circumstances afiecting the child. As such, we are of the view that the following https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 3

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guidelines are necessary and ought to be considered when balancing a child’s best interests and parental rights and responsibility: (a) The existence of a parental responsibility agreement between the parties. (b) The past performance of each parent. (c) Each parent’s presence including his or her ability to guide the child and provide for the child’s overall well-being. (d) The ascertainable wishes of a child who is capable of expressing his or her opinion. (e) The financial status of each parent. (f) The individual needs of each child. (g) The quality of the available home environment. (h) The need to preserve personal relations and direct contact with the child by both parents unless it is not in the best interests of the child. (i) The need to ensure that children are not placed in alternative care unnecessarily. (j) The mental health of the parents; and (k) The totality of the circumstances.” 27. Counsel submitted that when these factors are applied to the present case, they overwhelmingly favour the Plaintifi. 28. It was further submitted that the evidence demonstrates that the minors have continuously resided with the Plaintifi in a stable and familiar environment, where their education, shelter and welfare have been secured. 29. Counsel also cited the High Court decision in MA v ROO [2013] eKLR, where the Court held: “ What is the best interest of the child has not been defined by the law. This is as it should be because the best interest of each particular child will depend on the circumstances of each particular case at any one particular time. What is not in dispute, however, is that there are certain minimum requirements that have universally been accepted to constitute the best interest of the child. This includes the right of a child to be provided with shelter, food, clothing and education. The child is entitled to medical care. The child’s welfare should be taken care of under the best possible circumstances.” 30. Counsel argued that the Plaintifi has satisfied all these requirements and that no evidence was adduced to demonstrate that he is unfit to retain custody. 31. On the issue of the tender years doctrine, counsel acknowledged that one of the minors is of tender age but urged the Court to depart from the traditional presumption. 32. Reliance was placed on SMM v ANK [2021] eKLR, where the Court held: “ However, it is apparent that while the Tender Years Doctrine is persuasive in considering custody of children, it can no longer be considered as an infiexible rule of law. This is not to https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 4

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say that the substance of the rule has dissipated completely; it is to say that its infiexibility has been eroded by the evolving standards of decency refiected in Article 53 of the Constitution. Difierently put, the welfare of the children is the primary factor of consideration when deciding custody cases.” 33. Counsel submitted that the doctrine must yield where the best interests of the children demand otherwise, particularly where the father has provided consistent care and stability. 34. It was also argued that the Children Oficer’s report supports the Plaintifi’s case and recommends that the minors remain in their current environment. 35. Counsel urged the Court to maintain the existing arrangement so as not to disrupt the children’s schooling, emotional stability, and development. 36. On costs, counsel relied on the principle that costs follow the event and cited Orix Oil Limited v Paul Kabeu [2014] eKLR, where the Court held: “ …costs follow the event, and the Plaintifi being the successful party should ordinarily be awarded costs unless its conduct is such that it would be denied the costs or the successful issue was not attracting costs.” 37. Counsel ultimately prayed that the Plaintifi be granted full custody with the Defendant having structured access. The Defendant’s Submissions 38. Counsel for the Defendant, FNM, submitted that the Plaintifi has failed to demonstrate circumstances warranting the grant of sole custody and that the Court ought to grant legal, actual and physical custody to the Defendant. 39. Counsel similarly relied on Article 53 of the Constitution, emphasizing the principle that the best interests of the child are paramount. 40. Further reliance was placed on Section 8 of the Children Act, 2022, reinforcing the centrality of the welfare principle. 41. Counsel submitted that Kenyan jurisprudence has consistently recognized that children of tender years should ordinarily remain in the custody of the mother unless exceptional circumstances exist. 42. In support of this proposition, counsel cited the Court of Appeal decision in Karanu v Karanu [1975] EA 188, where the Court held: “ The substantial question in this appeal is whether or not the judge was right in giving custody of the children to the father… The Judge correctly directed himself that in cases of this nature, the paramount consideration was the welfare of the children but he did not specifically refer to the generally accepted rule that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the custody of young children should be given to the mother.” 43. Counsel also relied on Githunguri v Githunguri [1981] KLR, where the Court stated: “ The prima facie rule (which is now quite clearly settled) is that, other things being equal, children of this tender age should be with their mother, and where a court gives custody of a tender child to the father, it is incumbent on it to make sure that there are really suficient https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 5

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reasons to exclude the prima facie rule… I realize that as a general rule it is better for little girls to be brought up by their mother.” 44. Counsel submitted that no such exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated against the Defendant. 45. Further reliance was placed on Sospeter Ojaamong v Lynette Amondi Otieno, Civil Appeal No. 176 of 2006, where the Court of Appeal stated: “ The general principle of law is that custody of such children should be awarded to the mother unless special and peculiar circumstances exist to disqualify her… The mother’s disgraceful conduct, say her immoral behaviour, drunken habits, bad company are some of the factors which would disqualify her from being awarded custody of a child of tender age.” 46. Counsel argued that there is no evidence that the Defendant falls under any of these disqualifying factors. 47. It was further submitted that the Plaintifi has efiectively delegated parental responsibility to grandparents and other relatives, which undermines the principle that children should receive direct parental care. 48. Counsel relied on the broader welfare principle enunciated in Forsythe v Jones SCCA 49 of 1999, as adopted in Kenyan jurisprudence: “ A court which is considering the custody of a child, mindful that its welfare is of paramount importance, must consider the child’s happiness, its moral or religious upbringing, the social and educational infiuences, its psychological and physical well-being and its physical and material surroundings, all of which go towards the true welfare of the child.” 49. Counsel argued that the Defendant is better placed to provide direct parental care, supervision, emotional support, and guidance, particularly for the female minor. 50. Additionally, counsel referred to Article 19 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which provides: “ Every child is entitled to parental care and protection and shall wherever possible reside with his or her parents.” 51. Counsel submitted that the current arrangement deprives the minors of meaningful interaction with their mother. 52. It was also argued that denying the Defendant custody would amount to unjustified interference with maternal care, contrary to established principles of child welfare. 53. On costs, counsel relied on Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act and the decision in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, where the Supreme Court stated: “ The object of ordering a party to pay costs is to reimburse the successful party for amounts expended on the case. It must not be made merely as a penal measure. Costs are a means by which a successful litigant is recouped for expenses to which he has been put in fighting an action.” https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 6

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54. Counsel therefore urged the Court to find that the Defendant has proved her case on a balance of probabilities and to grant her custody of the minors, with the Plaintifi being granted access and parental obligations as appropriate. Issues for Determination 55. Having carefully considered the pleadings, the evidence tendered by the parties, and the submissions made by counsel, the Court is of the view that the following issues arise for determination: 1. Whether the Plaintifi (BKR) has proved that he should be granted legal, actual and physical custody of the minors. 1. Whether the Defendant (FNM), in her counterclaim, has proved that she is entitled to legal, actual and physical custody of the minors. 2. Whether there exist exceptional circumstances to justify departing from the general principle that children of tender years should be in the custody of their mother. 3. What orders regarding access and parental responsibility should be made in the best interests of the minors. 4. Who should bear the costs of this suit. Analysis of the Issues Issue 1 & 2: Whether the Plaintifi or the Defendant should be granted legal, actual and physical custody of the minors 56. I will consider these two issues together, as they are intertwined and revolve around the central question, what arrangement serves the best interests of the minors, DCR and LKR. 57. The guiding principle in all matters concerning children is firmly grounded in the Constitution and statute. 58. Article 53(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides: “ A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” 59. Similarly, Section 8(1) of the Children Act, No. 29 of 2022 provides: “ In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies— 60. (a) the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration; and (b) the best interests of the child shall include, but shall not be limited to the considerations set out in the First Schedule.” The import of these provisions is that the dispute before this Court is not about the competing rights of the parents, but about the welfare, development, and well-being of the minors. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 7

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61. This position was succinctly captured in J.O. v S.A.O [2016] eKLR, where the Court held: “ In matters of custody of children, the court’s paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. The rights of the parents take a secondary position.” 62. In determining custody, Kenyan courts have developed clear guiding principles. One such principle is that the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the conduct of each parent, the environment ofiered, and the ability to meet the needs of the child. 63. In Mutheu Agatha Khimilu v Raheem Mehdi Aziz Azad & 4 Others [2023] KESC 1 (KLR), the Supreme Court stated: “ Courts… are mandated to consider all circumstances afiecting the child… The focus must be on the child and what is best for him or her.” 64. Applying these principles to the present case, the evidence reveals the following: First, on stability and continuity, it is not controverted that since the interim orders of the Court, the minors have been residing with the Plaintifi and attending school in Molo. Courts have consistently emphasized the importance of maintaining a stable environment for children. 65. In M.A.A v A.B.S [2018] eKLR, the Court held: “ The child is entitled to be given a suitable, conducive and loving environment in which to grow… and stability is a key factor in achieving this.” 66. Disrupting a child’s schooling and social environment without compelling justification may be detrimental to their welfare. 67. Second, on the actual care and presence of the parent, the evidence shows that although the Defendant is willing to assume custody, she works away from the children and has historically been absent for extended periods due to her employment. 68. Courts have placed significant weight on the parent who has been consistently present and directly involved in the day-to-day upbringing of the child. 69. In P.O v M.S.O [2014] eKLR, the Court held: “ Custody should ordinarily be granted to the parent who has demonstrated commitment to the day-to-day care and upbringing of the child.” 70. The Plaintifi has demonstrated that he has been the primary caregiver, particularly in the period immediately preceding the suit and thereafter. 71. Third, on delegation of care to extended family, the Defendant argues that the Plaintifi leaves the minors under the care of grandparents and relatives. While this is a relevant consideration, it must be put into proper context. 72. Kenyan courts have recognized the role of the extended family in child upbringing. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 8

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73. In MKN v JNM [2014] eKLR, the Court observed: “ In the African context, the extended family is part of the social support system and its role in the upbringing of children cannot be discounted.” 74. Unless it is shown that such an arrangement is harmful, the mere involvement of grandparents does not render a parent unsuitable. 75. Fourth, on the wishes of the child, Section 8(4) of the Children Act requires the Court to give due consideration to the views of a child who is capable of forming an opinion. Section 8(4) provides: “ In determining the best interests of the child, the child shall be given an opportunity to express his or her opinion… and the opinion shall be taken into account.” 76. From the evidence, DCR expressed a nuanced position, acknowledging the role of the Defendant, but also indicating that they are currently settled with the Plaintifi. The Court must treat such evidence with caution, but it is a relevant factor. 77. Fifth, on financial and emotional capacity, both parties are employed and capable of providing for the minors. There is no evidence that either parent is financially incapable or morally unfit. 78. In BMM v JIL [2012] eKLR, the Court stated: “ Financial ability alone is not the determining factor. The Court must consider emotional support, guidance and overall welfare.” 79. Taking all the above into account, I find that while both parents are loving and capable, the current arrangement with the Plaintifi provides greater stability, continuity, and consistency, which aligns with the best interests of the minors at this stage. Issue 3: Whether There Exist Exceptional Circumstances to Warrant Departure from the Tender Years Doctrine 80. The Defendant placed considerable reliance on the well-established principle that children of tender years ought, as a general rule, to be placed under the custody of their mother. This principle has long been part of our jurisprudence and was succinctly articulated in Karanu v Karanu [1975] EA 188, where the Court observed: “ The generally accepted rule is that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the custody of young children should be given to the mother.” 81. Similarly, in Githunguri v Githunguri [1981] KLR 598, the Court reafirmed that: “ Children of tender age should be with their mother unless there are suficient reasons to exclude the prima facie rule.” 82. However, it must be emphasized that the tender years doctrine, though persuasive, is not a rigid or infiexible rule of law. The evolution of constitutional and statutory standards, particularly under Article 53(2) of the Constitution, which elevates the best interests of the child to a paramount consideration, has necessarily rendered the doctrine subordinate to that overriding principle. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 9

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83. This position was aptly stated in SMM v ANK [2021] eKLR, where the Court held: “ The tender years doctrine is no longer an infiexible rule and must give way to the best interests of the child.” 84. Accordingly, the Court’s task is not to mechanically apply the presumption in favour of the mother, but rather to interrogate whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there exist exceptional circumstances suficient to justify a departure from that prima facie position. 85. In undertaking that inquiry, the Court adopts a holistic and fact-sensitive approach, evaluating the entire context in which the minors are situated. Of particular relevance is whether the children have established and settled living arrangements, the degree of stability in their current environment, the strength of their emotional attachment to the parent presently providing care, and the likely impact— psychological, educational, and social—of a change in custody. 86. The courts have recognised that the existence of a stable and well-functioning custodial arrangement may itself constitute such exceptional circumstance. In JKN v HWN [2019] eKLR, the Court observed: “ Where children have settled in a particular environment and are well taken care of, that in itself may constitute an exceptional circumstance.” 87. Applying these principles to the present case, I am satisfied that suficient exceptional circumstances have been established to warrant a departure from the tender years presumption. 88. First, the evidence demonstrates that the minors are presently settled within a defined educational and social environment under the care of the Plaintifi. They are attending school within that locality and have, in the intervening period, adapted to that setting. 89. Secondly, the Plaintifi has been shown to have exercised primary and consistent care over the minors, particularly during the period material to this dispute. There is no evidence suggesting that he has failed in discharging his parental obligations. 90. Thirdly, no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the Plaintifi is unfit, whether by reason of neglect, abuse, or any conduct that would militate against his suitability as a custodial parent. 91. Finally, it is evident that a sudden disruption of the current custodial arrangement would expose the minors to unnecessary instability, with attendant consequences on their emotional and educational development. Courts must be slow to sanction such disruption unless compelling reasons are demonstrated. 92. In the premises, and upon a careful evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, I find that the established stability, continuity of care, and the absence of any adverse evidence against the Plaintifi constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of the law. 93. The result is that the presumption in favour of maternal custody, though acknowledged, is in this case properly displaced in favour of an arrangement that better serves the best interests of the minors. Issue 4: Access and Parental Responsibility 94. Even where a court determines that custody ought to vest in one parent, it remains an enduring duty of the Court to safeguard the child’s right to maintain a meaningful and continuing relationship with https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 10

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the other parent. The law does not contemplate the exclusion of one parent from a child’s life save in the clearest of cases. 95. The constitutional foundation of this principle is found in Article 53(1)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which provides: “ Every child has the right… to parental care and protection, which includes equal responsibility of the mother and father to provide for the child, whether they are married to each other or not.” 96. This position is reinforced in statutory form under Section 24(1) of the Children Act, 2022, which stipulates: “ Where a child’s father and mother were married to each other at the time of his birth, they shall have parental responsibility for the child and neither the father nor the mother shall have a superior right or claim against the other in the exercise of such parental responsibility.” 97. These provisions underscore a fundamental tenet of child law: parental responsibility is joint, continuous, and inextricably linked to the child’s right to parental care. Custody, therefore, does not operate to extinguish or diminish the parental role of the non-custodial parent. 98. The courts have consistently afirmed this position. In J.O v S.A.O [2016] eKLR, the Court authoritatively held: “ It is in the best interest of the child that he or she enjoys the love and afiection of both parents unless there are compelling reasons otherwise.” 99. This Court fully associates itself with that reasoning. Indeed, the child’s welfare is most efiectively promoted where both parents remain actively engaged in his or her upbringing, providing emotional support, guidance, and a sense of identity. 100. In the present case, there is no evidence placed before the Court to suggest that the Defendant, FNM, is an unfit parent, or that her access to the minors would in any way be detrimental to their welfare. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that she has maintained an interest in their lives and is desirous of remaining involved in their upbringing. 101. In those circumstances, it would be inimical to the best interests of the minors to curtail or unduly restrict her access. The Court must instead craft orders that foster, rather than fracture, the parental bond. 102. Accordingly, the Defendant shall be entitled to reasonable, meaningful, and structured access to the minors, including but not limited to access during school holidays, agreed weekends where practicable, and through consistent communication by telephone or other appropriate means. Such access shall be exercised in a manner that upholds the welfare of the minors and respects the primary custodial arrangement. 103. Ultimately, the Court’s objective is to ensure that the minors continue to benefit from the love, care, and guidance of both parents, in keeping with the constitutional and statutory imperative that the best interests of the child remain paramount. Issue 5: Costs 104. This being a matter concerning children, the Court must approach costs with caution. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 11

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105. In Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court held: “ Costs are a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised judiciously…” 106. Further, in family matters, courts have generally held that each party should bear their own costs. 107. In ZAK v MA [2013] eKLR, the Court held: “ In matters concerning children, it is often appropriate that each party bears their own costs so as not to exacerbate familial confiict.” 108. In the circumstances of this case, and considering that both parties are parents of the minors, I find that each party shall bear their own costs. Disposition 109. In the result, having carefully considered the pleadings, the evidence on record, the rival submissions, and the applicable law, and guided at all times by the paramount principle of the best interests of the child, this Court makes the following orders: 1. Custody Legal custody of the minors, DCR and LKR, shall be jointly vested in both parents, namely BKR and FNM. However, actual and physical custody of the minors is hereby awarded to the Plaintifi, BKR. 2. Access The Defendant, FNM, shall have reasonable and structured access to the minors as follows: a. On school holidays. b. Alternate weekends, where practicable and with due regard to the minors’ schooling and welfare; c. Unrestricted communication with the minors by telephone or other appropriate means at reasonable times. 3. Parental Responsibility Both parents shall continue to exercise equal parental responsibility over the minors in accordance with Article 53(1)(e) of the Constitution and the Children Act. In particular: a. The Plaintifi shall continue to provide for the minors’ day-to-day needs, including education, shelter, and upkeep; b. Both parties shall jointly cater for the minors’ medical needs, including ensuring that the minors are enrolled in a suitable medical insurance scheme. 4. Non-Interference Each parent shall ensure that the minors maintain a good relationship with the other parent and shall not interfere with or obstruct access as herein provided. https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 12

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5. Liberty to Apply Either party shall have liberty to apply in the event of dificulty in implementing these orders or upon a change of circumstances afiecting the welfare of the minors. 6. Costs Given that this is a matter concerning the welfare of children, each party shall bear their own costs. JUDGMENT DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 30TH DAY OF JUNE 2026 SIGNED V. O. ADET SENIOR PRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE In The Presence Of Ms. Kimoriot For The Defendant Karanja For The Plaintifi Defendant Present Ms. Chemutai/john As The Court Assistants https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/255/eng@2026-06-30 13

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