Julia Nayala (Suing as the Legal Administrator of the Estate of the Late John Lopeiyok Etukan (Deceased)) v Francis Njagi Wahome & Another

5. The Plaintiff also pleaded reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 6. The Defendants deny negligence. They contend that the deceased was himself negligent and that he entered the path of the vehicle suddenly and without warning. They further plead that the driver took reasonable steps to avoid the accident and that the accident was inevitable. 7. The Plaintiff seeks general damages under the Law Reform Act and Fatal Accidents Act, Special Damages of Kshs.78,980.00, costs and interest. 8. The Plaintiff's claim for dependency originally proceeded on the basis that the deceased was 23 years old and was allegedly employed as a loader earning approximately Kshs.15,000.00 per month. The evidence at the hearing, however, did not establish the alleged employment or income. In particular, there is no employment contract, payslip, bank statement or other documentary evidence establishing that the deceased was employed as a loader or earned Kshs.15,000.00 per month. The death certificate records the deceased's occupation as “XXX”. 9. The Court must therefore determine liability on the evidence actually placed before it and assess quantum on the basis of what has been proved rather than what was merely pleaded. THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE 10. The Plaintiff's case is that the deceased was a pedestrian using the Nakuru–Nairobi Highway and that he was crossing the road at a designated pedestrian crossing when he was struck by KBN 924 U. 11. The Plaintiff contends that the Motor Vehicle was being driven negligently and that the driver failed to exercise the care required of a reasonable motorist. 12. The Plaintiff relies on the evidence tendered concerning the circumstances of the accident, the Police Abstract and the evidence of the Witnesses called on her behalf. 13. In relation to dependency, the Plaintiff's case is that the deceased was a young man aged 23 years and that the Plaintiff was a person entitled to claim dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act. 14. The Plaintiff submits that the deceased's alleged income should be assessed using the applicable minimum wage and

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that a multiplier of 37 years and dependency ratio of twothirds should be applied. 15. On pain and suffering, the Plaintiff submits that the deceased did not die instantaneously but was taken to hospital, underwent medical examination and subsequently died while undergoing treatment. THE DEFENDANTS' CASE 16. The Defendants deny that the accident was caused by their negligence. 17. The Defence alleges that the deceased failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, failed to keep a proper lookout, crossed the road recklessly and unexpectedly entered the path of the Motor Vehicle. 18. The Defendants further contend that the driver did all that could reasonably be expected of him. The Defence witness states that he was travelling at approximately 50 kilometres per hour at about 8.00 p.m. when the deceased suddenly appeared on the road. 19. According to the Defence witness, he hooted, flashed his lights, applied the brakes and attempted to swerve but could not avoid the collision. 20. The Defence therefore maintains that the accident was inevitable or was substantially caused by the negligence of the deceased. EVIDENCE 21. During the hearing, PW1, James Maina Nganga, testified that he had adopted his Witness Statement and relied on the documents filed by the Plaintiff. He gave evidence concerning the circumstances of the deceased and the loss suffered following his death. PW1 described the deceased as a casual labourer and gave evidence regarding his alleged earnings. However, no documentary evidence was produced to establish that the deceased was in regular employment or earned a fixed monthly income. His evidence regarding the deceased’s alleged employment and income must therefore be considered with caution, particularly in determining the claim for loss of dependency. PW1 also gave evidence touching on the circumstances of the accident, although his evidence disclosed limitations regarding his personal

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knowledge of the precise manner in which the collision occurred. 22. PW2, Julia Nayala, testified concerning her relationship with the deceased, the circumstances surrounding his death and the loss suffered following the accident. She gave evidence relevant to the claims under the Fatal Accidents Act and the Law Reform Act. According to her evidence, the deceased was taken to hospital after the accident and subsequently died while undergoing treatment. The Court has considered her evidence together with that of PW1, the documentary evidence and the evidence presented by the Defence. 23. PW3, No. 68282 Corporal Wilson Yegon, testified as the police officer who produced the Police Abstract relating to the accident. He confirmed that the accident had been reported and that the deceased was involved in the accident. PW3, however, was not at the scene when the accident occurred and therefore had no personal knowledge of the precise manner in which the collision took place. During cross-examination, it emerged that he did not produce a sketch map, photographs, measurements or other sceneinvestigation material capable of independently establishing the point of impact or the respective positions of the deceased and the motor vehicle immediately before the collision. He further confirmed that the police abstract did not, by itself, establish the existence of a zebra crossing at the point where the accident occurred. 24. The evidence of PW3 therefore principally established the occurrence and reporting of the accident and the involvement of the deceased. It did not, of itself, establish the precise manner in which the accident occurred or determine which party was negligent. The fact that the driver was not charged with a traffic offence was similarly not treated as determinative of civil liability. The issue before this Court is whether negligence has been established on a balance of probabilities. 25. DW1, Joseph Maina Wanjiku, testified for the Defence and adopted his witness statement. His evidence was that he was the driver of Motor Vehicle Registration Number KBN 924 U on the material evening. He testified that on 19 April 2024 at about 8.00 p.m., he was driving along the Nakuru–Nairobi Highway at approximately 50 kilometres per hour when a

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pedestrian suddenly appeared on the road. According to DW1, he hooted and flashed the vehicle’s headlights and immediately applied the brakes in an attempt to avoid the pedestrian. 26. DW1 further testified that he also attempted to swerve but was unable to avoid the collision. He explained that there was a rail on one side of the road and other vehicles were travelling on the other lane, thereby limiting the room available for him to manoeuvre. He testified that the pedestrian was consequently struck by the motor vehicle. After the accident, DW1 stated that he stopped and made arrangements for the injured person to be taken to hospital and thereafter reported the accident at Central Police Station. 27. The Defence evidence was therefore that the accident was sudden and unavoidable and that DW1 had been driving with due care and at a reasonable speed. The Defence disputed the allegation that the deceased was lawfully crossing the road at a designated zebra crossing and maintained that the accident was substantially or wholly attributable to the deceased’s own conduct. The Defence pleaded, among other matters, that the deceased failed to keep a proper lookout, crossed the road recklessly, walked into the path of the Motor Vehicle and failed to heed the warning given by the driver. 28. The Defence further denied the particulars of negligence pleaded by the Plaintiff and denied that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. In the alternative, the Defence pleaded contributory negligence and contended that, if the Court were to find any negligence on the part of the driver, the deceased was himself substantially responsible for the occurrence of the accident. 29. The Court has considered the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 and DW1 as a whole. The Plaintiff’s evidence establishes the occurrence of the accident and the death of the deceased, while the Defence evidence provides an account from the driver as to how the collision occurred. The central question is therefore not whether an accident occurred, which is common ground, but whether the Plaintiff has proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver and, if so, whether the Defence has

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established contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. 30. In resolving that question, the Court must assess the credibility and consistency of the competing accounts, the extent of each witness’s personal knowledge, the documentary evidence produced, the absence or presence of independent scene evidence, and the circumstances in which the collision occurred. It is against that evidential background that the Court proceeds to determine the issues of liability and contributory negligence. SUBMISSIONS 44. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants should be held 100% liable for the accident. It was argued that the deceased was lawfully crossing the road at a designated zebra crossing and that the driver consequently owed him a heightened duty of care. The Plaintiff further submitted that the Defence had not produced sufficient independent evidence, such as a sketch plan, photographs or a traffic investigation report, to demonstrate how the accident occurred or to establish that the deceased had entered the roadway in circumstances that could reasonably be attributed to him. 45. The Plaintiff further submitted that the evidence of the Police Officer who produced the Police Abstract should be treated with caution because he was not the investigating officer. It was argued that the police abstract was not, by itself, conclusive evidence of the manner in which the accident occurred or of negligence on the part of either party. 46. On quantum, the Plaintiff submitted that an award of Kshs.100,000.00 was appropriate for pain and suffering and a further Kshs.100,000.00 for loss of expectation of life. In respect of loss of dependency, the Plaintiff urged the Court to adopt the multiplier approach in assessing the damages payable. 47. The Plaintiff therefore urged the Court to find the Defendants wholly liable for the accident and to award the

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damages sought under the respective heads, together with costs and interest. 48. The Defendants did not file Written Submissions, despite having been directed by the Court to do so. There were consequently no submissions on behalf of the Defendants to consider on either liability or quantum. The Court has nevertheless considered the Defence filed, the evidence tendered by DW1, the Cross-Examination of the Plaintiff’s Witnesses and the entire record in determining the issues before it. The absence of written submissions does not relieve the Plaintiff of the legal burden of proving the claim on a balance of probabilities. ANALYSIS AND ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 50. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced by the parties and the submissions filed on behalf of the Plaintiff, and noting that the Defendants did not file their written submissions despite being directed by the Court to do so, I consider that the following issues arise for determination: 1) Whether the accident occurred in the manner pleaded by the Plaintiff; 2) Whether the driver of Motor Vehicle Registration Number KBN 924 U was negligent and, if so, whether such negligence caused or materially contributed to the accident; 3) Whether the deceased was crossing the road at a designated zebra crossing at the time of the accident and the legal significance of that finding; 4) Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in the circumstances of this case and, if so, what evidential effect it has; 5) Whether the deceased was contributorily negligent and, if so, to what extent; 6) What proportion of liability should be apportioned between the Defendants and the deceased; 7) Whether the Plaintiff has proved entitlement to damages under the Law Reform Act, including damages for pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life; 8) Whether the Plaintiff has proved loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act;

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9) Whether the multiplier/multiplicand approach is appropriate for assessing loss of dependency in the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the absence of satisfactory evidence of the deceased’s employment and income; 10) If the multiplier/multiplicand approach is inappropriate, what global award, having regard to the deceased’s age, the evidence of dependency and comparable authorities, should be made for loss of dependency; 11) Whether the Special Damages pleaded by the Plaintiff were specifically pleaded and strictly proved and, if so, the amount properly awardable; and 12) What orders should issue concerning costs and interest. WHETHER THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE MANNER PLEADED 13) The first issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident occurred in the manner pleaded. 14) The Plaintiff’s case is that on 19th April 2024, the deceased was walking along the Nakuru–Nairobi Highway and was crossing the road when he was knocked by Motor Vehicle Registration Number KBN 924 U, sustaining injuries from which he subsequently died. The occurrence of a collision involving the deceased and Motor Vehicle KBN 924 U is not seriously disputed by the Defence, and both the Police evidence and the evidence of the Defence witness confirm the occurrence of the accident. 15) The real dispute is therefore not whether an accident occurred, but the circumstances in which it occurred. The Plaintiff maintains that the deceased was lawfully crossing the road at a designated zebra crossing and that the driver failed to exercise reasonable care to stop, slow down or otherwise avoid the collision. 16) The Defence, on the other hand, maintains that the deceased suddenly entered the path of the Motor Vehicle and that the driver hooted, flashed his lights, braked and attempted to swerve but was unable to avoid the collision. 17) Having considered the evidence as a whole, I find that the Plaintiff has established that the deceased was struck by Motor Vehicle KBN 924 U and sustained fatal injuries. However, the evidence does not establish with the same degree of certainty the deceased’s precise position on the roadway immediately before the impact or whether he was

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physically within the designated zebra crossing at the moment he was struck. That distinction becomes material when determining whether the driver was solely responsible for the accident or whether the deceased also contributed to its occurrence. WHETHER THE DRIVER OF KBN 924 U WAS NEGLIGENT 18) The second issue is whether the driver of KBN 924 U was negligent and whether such negligence caused or materially contributed to the accident. A driver owes other road users, including pedestrians, a duty to exercise reasonable care, maintain a proper lookout, maintain reasonable control of the vehicle and adjust the manner and speed of driving to the circumstances prevailing on the road. 19) In Njuguna & Another v Kamau [2024] KEHC 586 (KLR), the High Court recognised that both motorists and pedestrians owe duties of care to other road users, while observing the particular responsibility placed upon a driver because a Motor Vehicle is capable of causing serious injury or death. Similarly, in Kamau v John [2025] KEHC 1622 (KLR), the Court emphasised that a driver does not cease to owe a duty of care merely because a pedestrian may also have acted negligently. 20) DW1 testified that he was travelling at approximately 50 kilometres per hour when the deceased suddenly appeared in front of the vehicle and that he hooted, flashed the vehicle’s lights, applied the brakes and attempted to swerve. That evidence provides an explanation for the occurrence of the collision and must be considered alongside the Plaintiff’s evidence rather than rejected merely because it emanates from the Defence. 21) The difficulty with the Defence account, however, is that there is no independent evidence establishing the precise distance between the vehicle and the deceased when the deceased was first observed, the actual speed of the vehicle, the available stopping distance, the driver’s reaction time, the condition and configuration of the road or the precise point of impact. No sketch map, photographs, measurements or traffic reconstruction evidence was

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produced to assist the Court in determining whether the driver had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the collision. 22) In Muiruri & Another v NN (Suing as Legal Representative and Next Friend of MWN) [2025] KEHC 8106 (KLR), the High Court considered the duty of a driver confronted with a pedestrian on the road and emphasised the obligation of a driver to maintain sufficient control of a potentially dangerous machine. The decision illustrates that the Court must examine whether the driver exercised reasonable control and whether the circumstances disclosed an opportunity to avoid the accident. 23) In the present case, I accept that DW1 took some evasive action, but I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that the collision was inevitable or that the driver exercised every reasonable precaution expected of him. On a balance of probabilities, I therefore find that the driver failed to exercise the degree of care reasonably expected in the circumstances and that his negligence materially contributed to the accident. WHETHER THE ZEBRA CROSSING DECEASED WAS CROSSING AT A 24) The third issue is whether the deceased was crossing the road at a designated zebra crossing. This issue is important because a pedestrian using a designated crossing is entitled to expect approaching motorists to exercise an enhanced degree of caution and to take reasonable steps to avoid a collision. 25) In Njuguna & Another v Wanyoike & Gathanga [2026] KEHC 267 (KLR), the High Court considered a case in which clear eyewitness evidence established that the deceased pedestrian was crossing at a designated zebra crossing when he was struck by the Motor Vehicle. The Court recognised the heightened duty of care owed by the motorist in those circumstances. 26) The evidential position in the present case is materially different. PW3 was not an eyewitness to the accident, the Police Abstract does not independently establish the existence or precise location of a zebra crossing and no sketch map, photographs, measurements or other sceneinvestigation evidence was produced. The Court is therefore

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unable to determine with sufficient certainty that the deceased was physically within the zebra crossing at the precise point of impact. 27) I therefore find that although the Plaintiff pleaded and relied upon the existence of a zebra crossing, that allegation has not been sufficiently established by independent evidence to warrant a finding that the deceased was unquestionably crossing at the designated point when he was struck. This finding does not, however, absolve the driver of his general duty to exercise reasonable care towards pedestrians. WHETHER RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES 28) The fourth issue is whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. The doctrine is a rule of evidence which may permit an inference of negligence where the circumstances of an accident are such that, in the ordinary course, the accident would not have occurred without negligence and the circumstances point sufficiently towards the Defendant. 29) In Embu Public Road Services Ltd v Riimi (1968) EA 22, the East African Court of Appeal explained the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate, while in Nabutola & Another v Kinyanjui & Another [2024] KEHC 9307 (KLR) the High Court reiterated that the doctrine does not relieve a Claimant of establishing circumstances from which negligence may reasonably be inferred. 30) Likewise, in Mutemi v Ngugi & Another [2024] KEHC 3966 (KLR), relying upon Keziah & Another (Personal Representatives of the Late Isaac Macharia Mutunga) v Lochab Transport Limited [2022] KECA 477 (KLR), the High Court emphasised that the mere occurrence of an accident does not automatically establish negligence. 31) In this case, there are competing explanations for the accident. The Plaintiff says that the deceased was properly crossing the road and that the driver failed to avoid him, while the Defence says that the deceased suddenly entered the path of the vehicle and that the driver took evasive action. In those circumstances, the Court cannot infer negligence solely from the occurrence of the collision. I therefore find that res ipsa loquitur does not, in the

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circumstances of this case, justify a finding of 100% liability against the Defendants. WHETHER THE DECEASED CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT 32) The fifth issue is whether the deceased was contributorily negligent. The Defence alleges that the deceased failed to keep a proper lookout, entered the road suddenly, crossed recklessly and failed to heed the warning given by the driver. The Defence bears the evidential burden of establishing the factual basis for those allegations. 33) DW1’s evidence provides some support for the contention that the deceased suddenly entered the path of the vehicle, since DW1 testified that the pedestrian appeared suddenly and that he immediately hooted, flashed his lights, braked and attempted to swerve. That evidence, however, does not establish every particular of negligence pleaded against the deceased, and there is no independent evidence demonstrating precisely where or how the deceased entered the roadway. 34) The Court must therefore avoid treating the driver’s account as conclusive while, at the same time, recognising that the Plaintiff has not established that the deceased was unquestionably and safely within the zebra crossing. On the totality of the evidence, I find that the deceased also failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety and thereby contributed to the occurrence of the accident. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY 35) The sixth issue is the proportion of liability to be borne by each party. The Court must assess the respective conduct of the driver and the deceased rather than impose automatic liability upon either party. The authorities recognise that a pedestrian owes a duty of care to other road users, just as the driver of a motor vehicle owes a duty of care to pedestrians. 36) Having considered the evidence, I find that the driver was negligent in failing to exercise the degree of care reasonably expected in the circumstances, while the deceased also contributed to the accident by failing to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances in which he entered or remained upon the roadway. The evidence does not justify attributing the entire responsibility to either party.

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37) I therefore apportion liability at 50% against the Defendants and 50% against the deceased. The Defendants shall accordingly be jointly and severally liable for 50% of the damages proved by the Plaintiff. DAMAGES UNDER THE LAW REFORM ACT 38) The seventh issue concerns the damages recoverable under the Law Reform Act. Pain and Suffering 39) The Plaintiff seeks Kshs.100,000.00 for pain and suffering, and the evidence indicates that the deceased did not die instantaneously but was taken to Mediheal Hospital, underwent medical assessment and subsequently died while undergoing treatment. 40) In Sukari Industries Ltd v Clyde Machimbo Juma [2016] eKLR, the Court recognised the period between injury and death as an important consideration in assessing damages for pain and suffering, while Delina General Enterprises Ltd v MKN [2017] KEHC 1260 (KLR) similarly recognised the distinction between instantaneous death and cases where the deceased survives for a period and undergoes treatment. 41) From the evidence on record, the accident occurred on 19TH April,2024 and the deceased died on 20th April,2024. 42) It is natural that any person who suffers injury as a result of an accident will suffer some form of pain. This pain may be brief and fleeting but it is nevertheless pain for which the deceased’s estate is entitled to compensation. The generally accepted principle is that nominal damages will be awarded on this head for death occurring immediately after the accident. Higher damages will be awarded if the pain and suffering is prolonged before the death. 43) According to various decisions of the High Court, the sums have ranged from Kshs.10,000.00 to Kshs.100,000.00 over the last 20 years and in this case therefore, I find Kshs.50,000.00.reasonable for pain and suffering. Loss of expectation of life 44) The Plaintiff also seeks Kshs.100,000.00 for loss of expectation of life. The deceased was aged 23 years at the time of his death, and his life was therefore prematurely terminated at a relatively young age. 45) In common law jurisprudence of which Kenya is part, the Courts have evolved two principles, loss of expectation of

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life and pain and suffering by the deceased, for award of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act for pain and suffering determined what is commonly referred to as a conventional sum which has increased over the years from Kshs.10,000.00 to Kshs.100,000.00 currently. 46) The generally accepted principle is that very nominal damages will be awarded on this head claim if death followed immediately after the accident. Higher damages will be awarded if the pain and suffering was prolonged before death. 47) In this case, the conventional figure for loss of expectation of life is Kshs.100,000.00 and I award the same. WHETHER LOSS OF DEPENDENCY WAS PROVED 48) The eighth issue is whether the Plaintiff has proved loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act. The Plaintiff’s case is that the deceased was employed as a loader earning Kshs.15,000 per month and that the Court should calculate dependency using a multiplier of 37 years and a dependency ratio of two-thirds. 49) The evidence does not, however, establish the alleged employment or income. There is no employment contract, payslip, Bank Statement, evidence from an employer or other documentary evidence establishing that the deceased was employed as a loader or earned a regular monthly income of Kshs.15,000.00 PW1’s reference to casual employment and alleged earnings is insufficient to establish a reliable multiplicand. 50) Of particular significance is the death certificate, which records the deceased’s occupation as “XXX.” The Court therefore cannot treat the allegation in the Plaint that the deceased was a loader earning Kshs.15,000.00 as a proved fact. The Court must determine the claim on the evidence actually produced rather than on an allegation that has not been substantiated. WHETHER THE MULTIPLIER/MULTIPLICAND APPROACH IS APPROPRIATE 51) The ninth issue is whether the multiplier/multiplicand approach is appropriate in the circumstances. Although the method is a recognised means of assessing loss of dependency, it is not mandatory where the evidence does not permit a reliable multiplicand to be established.

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52) In Albert Odawa v Gichumu Githenji [2007] eKLR , the Court of Appeal recognised that the multiplier approach is a method of calculation and that the Court must consider the circumstances of each case. In Moses Mairua Muchiri v Cyrus Maina Macharia [2016] KEHC 5958 (KLR), the High Court recognised that where the multiplicand cannot be ascertained with reasonable precision, a global award may be preferable to speculative mathematical calculations. 53) In the present case, applying a 37-year multiplier to an alleged income of Kshs.15,000.00 would require the Court first to assume an income and occupation which have not been proved. Such an approach would produce mathematical precision without evidential foundation. I therefore find that the multiplier/multiplicand method is inappropriate in this case GLOBAL AWARD FOR LOSS OF DEPENDENCY 54) The tenth issue is the appropriate global award for loss of dependency. The deceased was 23 years old, and although his income was not proved, the Court must nevertheless assess the pecuniary loss arising from his death on the evidence concerning his age, dependency and the circumstances of the case. 55) In Stanwel Holdings Limited & Another v Racheal Haluku Emanuel & Another [2020] KEHC 573 (KLR) , the deceased was aged 23 years and the Court adopted a Global Award of Kshs.1,000,000 for loss of dependency where the income was not satisfactorily established. In Nyaga v Muriuki [2024] KEHC 5252 (KLR) and CMO & Another v Asaga [2024] KEHC 12225 (KLR) , the Courts similarly recognised the appropriateness of a global approach where the evidential basis for a precise multiplicand was lacking. In Owuor (Suing as Legal Representative and Administrators of the Estate of Benard Onyango Ogunyo (Deceased)) v Aftah Petroleum K Ltd [2024] KEHC 4484 (KLR), the High Court adopted a global award of Kshs.1,200,000.00 in circumstances where the multiplier approach was inappropriate. 56) Having considered the deceased’s age of 23 years, the evidence concerning dependency, the absence of reliable proof of employment and income, the fact that the death certificate records his occupation as “XXX” and the

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comparable authorities, I find Kshs.1,200,000.00 to be a reasonable global award for loss of dependency. SPECIAL DAMAGES 57) The eleventh issue is whether the Special Damages pleaded by the Plaintiff were proved. The Plaintiff pleaded Special Damages of Kshs.78,980.00, comprising Kshs.30,000.00 for transport/hearse expenses, Kshs.19,480.00 for medical expenses, Kshs.4,500.00 for mortuary expenses and Kshs.25,000.00 for legal expenses incurred in obtaining the grant. 58) The Plaintiff’s submissions referred to Kshs.79,980.00, but the pleaded amount is Kshs.78,980.00 Since Special Damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and the Court is bound by the pleadings, the Court cannot award the additional Kshs.1,000.00 merely because a different figure was subsequently stated in submissions. 59) Having considered the documentary evidence produced in support of the pleaded items, I find that Kshs.78,980.00 has been proved and I accordingly award that amount as Special Damages. DISPOSITION 60) In the result, Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff against the Defendants, jointly and severally, on the following terms: a) Liability: Defendants – 50%; deceased – 50%. b) Pain and suffering...................................................Kshs.50,000.00 c) Loss of expectation of life.................................... Kshs.100,000.00 d) Loss of dependency......................................... Kshs.1,200,000.00 Total ....................................................................Kshs.1,35 0,000.00 Less 50% Contribution ........................................ (Kshs.675,000.00) e) Special Damages...................................................Kshs.78,980.00 f) Total...................................................................... Kshs.753,980.00 (Kenya shillings seven hundred and fifty three thousand ,nine hundred and eighty )

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The Plaintiff shall have the costs of the suit. Interest on the Special Damages shall accrue from the date of filing the suit until payment in full, while interest on the general damages shall accrue from the date of Judgment until payment in full. __________________ L.A. MUMASSABBA PRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE 30.9.2026 JUDGEMENT DATED, READ, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM THIS 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,2026 In the Absence of parties Court Assistant: Phoebe.

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