Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Kenya & another v Khaemba (Civil Appeal 522 of 2019) [2021] KECA 322 (KLR)
The bottom line
#Kenya's Court of Appeal confirmed that a judicial officer cannot be suspended before proper disciplinary charges are laid, and never without pay.
What this practically means
#Executive summary
#Questions the Court framed
#The issues the Court set itself to decide, in its own words.
- 1.What conditions, if any, are applicable to the exercise of the Chief Justice's disciplinary powers to suspend a judicial officer under the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act?
- 2.Whether a judicial officer can be suspended without pay under paragraph 17(3) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act
- 3.Whether the court can interfere with a disciplinary process initiated under the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act
Key legal issues
#Conditions precedent to the Chief Justice's power to suspend a judicial officer under paragraph 17(2) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act
Suspension under paragraph 17(2) requires that dismissal proceedings under paragraph 25 first be undertaken: an inquiry, framing and forwarding of charges, an opportunity for the officer to respond, and laying of the charges before the Judicial Service Commission. The Chief Justice suspended the respondent before any charge was framed and before JSC approval, and thereby acted unfairly and illegally.
A plain reading of paragraph 25 discloses four stages that must precede any opinion that an officer ought to be dismissed. The 30th May 2019 letter was merely an inquiry, not a charge; the suspension with nil pay preceded the framing of charges and the Commission's decision. Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act reinforce the procedural fairness required before suspension under paragraph 17(2).
Whether a judicial officer can be suspended without pay
No. There is no express or implied provision authorising suspension without pay; alimentary allowance under paragraph 17(3) is the entitlement, and its terms are for the Judicial Service Commission to determine by regulations, not the Chief Justice.
The terms of a statute withholding pay are penal and must be construed restrictively; a person should not be penalised except under clear law. The respondent's entitlement to alimentary allowance is grounded in constitutional fair labour practices and reasonableness. The Chief Justice, not being the repository of the power to determine pay, could not lawfully impose nil salary.
Whether courts can interfere with a disciplinary process initiated under the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act
Although exhaustion of alternative remedies is a constitutional and legal imperative, courts retain residual jurisdiction to intervene in exceptional circumstances such as illegality, procedural irregularity, prejudgment of culpability, and extreme hardship; here the process was illegal ab initio and nothing valid could be remitted.
The doctrine of exhaustion articulated in Speaker of National Assembly v Karume and Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru is subject to exceptional circumstances. The disciplinary process was marred by illegality from the start, the Chief Justice had pre-judged gross misconduct, and the respondent suffered extreme hardship through indefinite suspension with nil pay, rendering continuation an exercise in futility.
The role of this Court as a first appellate court
A first appeal to the Court of Appeal is by way of retrial: the Court re-evaluates the evidence and draws its own conclusions, while making due allowance for not having seen or heard the witnesses, and departs from trial findings only where they are unsupported by evidence or based on wrong principles.
Relying on Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Company Limited and Jabane v Olenja, the Court reiterated that it is not bound to accept trial court findings of fact but will depart only where the trial court failed to take account of particular circumstances or acted on wrong principles of law.
Legal principles established
#- Before the Chief Justice may suspend a judicial officer under paragraph 17(2) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act, dismissal proceedings under paragraph 25 must first be undertaken, including the laying of charges and any response before the Judicial Service Commission.
- A judicial officer cannot be suspended without pay; there is no provision in the Judicial Service Act or Employment Act permitting withholding of salary during suspension, and penal provisions must be construed restrictively.
- Only the Judicial Service Commission, not the Chief Justice, is empowered to determine the pay of a judicial officer on suspension.
- Courts retain a residual jurisdiction to intervene in internal disciplinary processes in exceptional circumstances, such as illegality, procedural irregularity and extreme hardship, notwithstanding the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies.
Court orders
#- 1.The orders in the judgment of the trial court dated 30th August 2019 in Nairobi ELRC Petition No 100 of 2019 are upheld, save to the extent that they may have been modified or qualified by the findings made in this judgment
- 2.The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent
- 3.The Registrar of the court is directed to send a copy of the judgment for the attention of the Attorney General, in light of the identified amendments and regulations required to be made to, and under the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act
The bench
#One judgment of the whole court — no separate or dissenting opinions.
- On appeal from
- Employment and Labour Relations Court
- Nairobi ELRC Petition No 100 of 2019
- Jurisdiction invoked
- First appeal to the Court of Appeal under the Court of Appeal's appellate jurisdiction
Relief refused
#The appellants' prayer that the matter be remitted back to the Judicial Service Commission for continuation of disciplinary proceedings
The disciplinary process was irregular and illegal ab initio, so there were no valid proceedings to remit
Costs
The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondent
Quotable passages
#Verbatim from the judgment, each located to the page it appears on in the official PDF — so these can be cited and checked directly.
We therefore make the following orders: 1. The orders in the judgment of the trial court dated 30th August 2019 in Nairobi ELRC Petition No 100 of 2019 are hereby upheld, save to the extent that they may have been modified or qualified by the findings made in this judgment. 2. The appeal herein is dismissed with costs to the respondent.
it is a condition precedent that before a suspension is effected under paragraph 17(2) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act, the applicable dismissal proceedings provided under paragraph 25 of the said Third Schedule must be undertaken
there is no express, implied or other provision or suggestion in the Judicial Service Act and Employment Act of 2007 that the salary of a judicial officer or other staff on suspension would be withheld or not paid during the period of suspension
repository of the power to determine the pay a judicial officer on suspension in paragraph 17(3) of the Third Schedule to the Judicial Service Act is the Judicial Service Commission and not the Chief Justice, who is not therefore empowered to make any decision as regards the pay of judicial officers on suspension
the impugned disciplinary process, having been irregular and illegal ab initio, meant there were no valid proceedings that could be remitted back to the appellants for consideration
The court is perfectly in order to intervene where there is clear abuse of discretion by such bodies, where arbitrariness, malice, capriciousness and disrespect of the rules of natural justice are manifest.
Issues in the judgment
#The judgment records the respondent's date of employment as 1st July 2020 while the petition was filed on 17th June 2019, which would predate the employment; this appears to be an error in the judgment itself.
The judgment inconsistently cites the section of the JSC HR Policies and Procedure Manual as 'section D7.2 (xviii)' in the narration and 'section D 72 (xvii)' when describing the Chief Justice's letter.
The trial court judgment date is given as 30th August 2019, yet the petition described was filed and amended in June 2019 with the appeal memorandum dated 24th October 2019; the narrative also describes a show cause letter of 30th May 2019 from the Chief Justice earlier attributed to a later date, indicating internal chronological inconsistencies.
Key timeline
#Practical implications
#Frequently asked questions
#Later judgments citing this (7)
#Judgments in the corpus that rely on this one. Where the Court said how it treated the authority, that is shown.
- Judicial Service Commssion v Wasamu (Civil Application E078 of 2025) [2026] KECA 915 (KLR)[2026] KECA 915 (KLR)15 May 2026
- Judicial Service Commission & another v LMN[2025] KESC 53 (KLR)15 Aug 2025
- Ondari v County Government of Kisii & 3 others (Petition E008 of 2025) [2025] KEELRC 1793 (KLR)[2025] KEELRC 1793 (KLR)19 Jun 2025
- Warfa v Mwangi & 3 others (Environment and Land Appeal E072 of 2023) [2025] KEELC 3272 (KLR)[2025] KEELC 3272 (KLR)8 Apr 2025applied
- Lumumba v Football Kenya Federation; Zoo Football Ltd (Interested Party) (Petition E009 of 2023) [2025] KEELRC 821 (KLR)[2025] KEELRC 821 (KLR)7 Mar 2025applied
- Nganga & 12 others v Kahiu (Environment and Land Appeal E098 of 2022) [2024] KEELC 7067 (KLR)[2024] KEELC 7067 (KLR)28 Oct 2024applied
- Veronica Njeri Wambui & 2 Others v Nancy Waithira Waweru9 May 2024applied
Cite this brief
#Cite this brief
Caselaw, "Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Kenya & another v Khaemba (Civil Appeal 522 of 2019) [2021] KECA 322 (KLR)", Case Analysis (2021). Civil Appeal (Nairobi). Source: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2021/322/eng@2021-12-17
Suggested citation format for research notes or client memos. Always verify the original judgment before relying on any point.